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A b m e t  
Leibnnr'r disasemena wiUl Malsbnnshc srs more than theologicdly 
cltdcnt Morco\rr o, Letbnlz r c m p u d  tn hlr f u ~ h  d n e l o p d  phnlaophy. has mucsm 
of  Malehrawhe hadapplnrataon more utdelv to Lake  and hcuron Utch ofthe 
ewhlcenth ccntun morcmcnt fnm Humo to Knnt had ,r\ orsdeesm 10 I h c r c \ c n m h  
s&rury debate &ween Malebranche and Lenbn~z while ~ a l e b m h e  meat- the 
conten for Hume-r cnttque ofUle ordinary mcqx o f  causaeon, Lelbnir'r response L 
Malebranche ruggem the dimtlon o f  Kant'r -nr~ to Hvme 
lmmduct8on 
This is a r l d y  of Lsibniz's reaction and rspoms to the 'ossariaralism' o f  
Malebramehe. W l l s  Leibnir'r diragrremcnu w.lh Malebranehe may usm to k o f  
merely theological significance, his anempll todiffermtiate himself fmm Malebranshe 
prefigure and have probably influenesd the direction ofthe great eighteenth eenlury 
developmsnrr eon~crning the n a m  o f  causation m Hvme and Kant Thus. allhough 
Letbnmz's attempts IO diff-tiste himself hom Mal-he do oesw m t k  context ofs 
theological debate. there is much mwe o f  intern IO the hmmw of modem phnlowphy 
here than a rnmple debate over Ood'r dignify and power 
Sin- this study is foeusedon Mnleb-he, Leiho8~ and their influence on the 
eighteenth seaury positions of Hume a d  Kant w.th mpet to sauralify. #t is divided into 
three chapen: one on Malebranshe's phnlmophy with w i f i c  anenrian to his critique 
of the Scholart~s mnsspr of causation, one on the hnrtory o f  Lsibnnz'r developmern ss 81 
anrer in reaction to Malsbranchs snd through the prompting of Amauld and one on su 
lrnpomnce to thP history o f  modern phtlowphy. 
Chnpr I offers an account o f  the ~ ~ i o ~ l i r m  o f  Malebranehe and Lsibniz'r 
mnmtial sympathy wth it, although w t h  reservations. This chapr  IS faeuwd on 
Mdsbranshe'r critique ofthe Scholastic mnceptotcaution as i t  a p p n  in -h
afler. 1 alw, is sonamed with Leibnsz'r early statements about the phil-fiy of 
Malsbranshe in their correspondence I haw benefited horn L k  work ofCharles 
McCrackm, who r iwter Mdebrrnfhe in his proper an ten  h u g h  r very full m u m  
of  Malebranchc's relation to bah thc New Physics of the seventeenth century d thc 
Scholnttc Aristotelian vsdntim. 
Chapkt 11 -1s s mdiingofthe h i m  of Leibnisr dsvslapmcnt as a reastion 
to Msleh-he and thmugh hirmnhontstion with Amauld I t  coven a nnge of the 
Leibntrian s o w  horn lk D i r m m  on Mmnhvrics thmugh Ihc Leibnlz-Amauld 
correrpondensc to Lsibniz'r mrpondence ui th Samuel Clarke. I have f e d  Stuan 
Bmun'r recent article on Leibnnr and Malebrsnsk pant~lar ly helpful. In it he 
snterpmr thc devslommt of Leibnir'r phil-y u a m i o n  to Malsbnnsk lhmugh 
the pmrnprlng o f  Amauld Nisholn lolley's MIL on Lnbnir and Losk, and Eiio 
Vailli's account ofthe Leibn~rClarke wmpondmse have bsm invaluable for the latet 
reaftton of Leibnir to Lwke d C l o r k s  
Chapter I11 draw our rtr ~mplicmonr o f  Leibnmz'r development for t k  
eishtecnth century debate klwa Hums a d  Kant Charlsr McCraeken giver a very full 
account of Malebranck'r relation to Hums. M a i d  Ruthnford pwider  an inUiguing 
interpretstatlon o f  Le8bnnr'r mature acswntof space, tims, and intenubsmisl causation; 
and Gonfncd Manin povlder a helpful interpmation of telstnonr in Lembniz'r philmophy 
\dth ~pscific reference to rpaee d tims. 
I have dradram m@er t h n s  manm in the following wnslusioion: thnr -teenth 
century debate prefigures the eighteenth centup dixws~on of~alrrrltty 8n Hums and 
Kant In w, doing I mi& rnyvlf to have revealed s major philowphcal signnficame 
of Le8bnnz.s response to oecssiwabsm. This is nnjusl wh.1 t t  apparj to be, adirplte 
between tM theologians over God's dipi tyard p o w .  It is a dirpvle ofmush mas 
philovlphmsal rign~fissna. Lenbniz'r mponse to Malebranche prefigures vhat is 
arguably ons of* rnosl sipifisantdcvelopnenD in the hiwry of modern philooophy - 
the response of K m  to Hume. 
Chapter 1: Wsb-he on Cnwation 
What is Lediffas- t=awem the ~(rrplr  ofeausption of Malebmmhe and 
LeibnlZ' This q d a n  deserves psrtisular anention s ine Leimi is  dim-mu with 
Malebranshe are o k n  -ted as a mere IheoIoqieaI dispute about God's digntv and 
w?sdom when. mwh mars significantly, the phil-y k h m d  thirdsbate prefigures 
(and har actually influmsed) Ur famous sightsnth century debateover thp ~ h a e  of 
causation. Although much ofthns wmtesnth centmy debate is Ihmlogieally inspired in 
the movement from Maleb-k thmugh Lenbnnr we can ue aderelopnmt away hom 
the Canesian conccptofcawaIion (witere, for smple. bodies amsnuidnsd to k 
entmrely p r w e  and without eavral force) toward the skepticism concaning the concept 
of eaudon in Hume o r t k  ~ubjsnive xplanation ofcawlion m the Kanivl 
philosophy. 
Much of dte development o f  the mnsept o f  causation in the phslosophy o f  Lcibnir 
assurr with," the sonten of& mnndbody pmblcm, which has tts mqin in the 
philosophy of Deranes. In his Meditatiom on Firrt Phil-ohy Dacsna ~ p r n t s d  
mind, whore principle m b m e  8% thought, and M y ,  whore principle ambute is 
sxtsnsion, as dlsnnst rvbnaneer that cannot lnterast with each other #n m y  w a y  M w h  
of Dasanss' philmophy. i ~ l v d i n g  this rubrant~vsd~m~nctim b veen mnnd and body, 
$3 a reannon agsinn Seholsnic Arirtotslianim. In -World for example. Derana 
hrghlrghu his d i f f eme  from t k  I\rinotelim wadition by focusing on their d~ffermt 
coneepcrof motion.' While a sciedfic Scholastic Arirrmelian srg lmt ion of, for 
example, uls d a n t  of a rock aRcr if b b a n  dmwn would bs @& in iu inhmnt 
qualitma or formal n a m  (the f m a l  nature as an ,amterzal v-nsipls of unity and 
ea-1 aclion). a C m r i a n  explanmion wouldeonrln solely in  norerrol mahsnlcal 
eavrer Thus, i nned  ofadm~mng r variety of inhersnt qualities as explanatory in the 
natwal rienssr, tk Canerian dininnion bmwm mind and body a l low Canernanr lo 
offer w~entlfis explanadom solely in  tsnns of the mechanical intenenon ofche 
geomemcal pmpsnier of ma- 
Ntsholas Malcb-he. r k  17th C e n w  Augurtinian Canerian and contemporary 
of Leibnms acsepls CksCWI6' dmial o f  mlndbody interaction md taker this wument 
even further, beyond wiw -n had commonly been in~rprsted B 4, denying 
body-bah/ (the external rsnon ofonc body an mother body) and midmind  nnterdon 
ftntcmal mmul acting, rush a my attemptto imagine a chimera) as well Now, 
rmarr ,t on o n e  .ntat~'puetm uw wt m bcn .bkto-plpl ,pl p l p l p l ~ d y  tlu. lu l u l u  lu- 
'L,"l.rltorrw,,"l.,"*U,*U*U ( m m , I " P M " D I . ,  , O r m l m . ~ " d ' Y . Y ) - r . l ~ I  I." 
cmoled to u % r t m m  I . # l n h u v c  I- onccmm t h I  I kh uxvnn the mrurcul t h r m n r r n  I 
d n l a e r o  mmr E l W h  llul t rm.. k o o . t w t o G d  \S \ "~C &A"" r-bndmul. 
n s o p n m  In? r n d d I U  Old ncll .>m uno , horn ,,,m I r  ,.b, h...,nrLa,hu Cod,, ,k ,"l\crul 
a - r r  He , I.CxlyIhluld mu uxl Ind,"nhl"" 'a" h.arnm",n. H I  .. I, ~ I ' l C h u h  \,.€lrkcn 
although Malebmhe'r  ocunonslism may nn have been either exclusively or wen 
primarily deigned m solve th pmblem of a-nt mmndaody nnmsetio~' it dar 
provide m min~werm thir pmblnn (as well as to the ph lems  of M y - M y  and mind- 
mind interaction). 
Male+-he's occasionalism. much like Descawd philosophy. can be 
undemlood as a c-ion q L i n % f k  SShOlasInc Mmpl  ofnplwe According to Cherls 
MsCrackn, i t  is bnt undmtmd when r s opposed10 the w physrsr of Ihc 
Sewteenth CsnNry.' In fan. occasionalirs make th heme objection to t k  new physics 
as they malre to Scholastic AtiN)tSI~an~m. A-ding to the new phyr~cs(where, for 
example, the pertisular motion of the canh a m d  the run IS explrlmd by Kppler'r three 
laws), thew laws are 10 twn expls8ned by more general law. Howeuer, aecadtngto the 
pmponens of the nov physics, the most gs-1 l a w  muld be e x p l a i d  only as the most 
ammedtats eKms ofGod-s will. In oppoat~on to thir view ofths nnfural world, 
occar~onalirs such as Malebnnsheask why in rvch an crplmt ion o m  would need 
nature's l a w  intsrvsning bM+n God's w l l  and pnieular evens, and funher. if we are 
to of think them as smehing anyway. then just what are thsy? They are faces and 
pawem (i.e . the forss of gravity and the force o f  inmia). But Canesianr m their 
rqsstlon o f  Scholastic Arirtoolianlm have vlgomlrsly opposed explmtialuofths 
natural world i n  terms o f  'forcer' and "powers' o f  whish wecan fann no c l w  idea 
emsp rhar they are the pqmled'cawe' o f  vhnowr thcy are Ulaught to evlain - as 
the nuttitwe power o f  b d  orthe dormalive po -o f9 im  Oscuionalins rveh u 
Maleb-he charge thal the new @ p i n  4 d  be as guiltyas the rhm lmcn  orgving 
empry exp1anatioru.i 
A s s m l  and well-know -1 of Mllebnnehe'r oceasionalirm is his critique 
o f  the concept ofcausation. In his The S-h after Trvth (1674). Maiebrancksrplisitly 
dlresu this stitiqus against the Schol&yis view of the natural world with is real p a v ~  
a n d c a w  M s l ~ s b e  has two pnmary objeenoru l o  the kholanic concept of 
causation: hr is monl, the o k l r  metsphysid. Although the* ue dininel 
objections, they bolh have rtmng theol~cical componena andcwld thus be accurately 
dewnbed as moral-U~mlorncal and metnphyri~l-Lmlog~cal cb~estma. 
Malebmhs'r  mom1 cbjeetmon w the Scholartic concept o f  causation involver 
h s  belief that the Scholan!~ sonssptofna-. where n a u  thlngr ue sonrtdered w 
porrerr their o m  force and be causally eficaciaur, leads w pganirm Accordnng to 
Malebmhs, if we accept the Scholastic vndmranding ofbodia as havlng snt~t ia m
them that are distinct from their maner, then wc ssn easily come to ~msgine thatthey are 
the m e  c a m s  o f U r  e f f '  that we abserve (i.e., i fwe  smp( that o p l m  has a 
dormativs power, then we fan easily some to imagine that apiwn can xmally eauv w w 
sleep) Nen, he a m  that our idea o f c a w  or of p o w  w an repnents romnhing 
divine He wntes: ^For the id- o f  r rovereign power 81 ths idea o f  rovereign divinnty. 
and the idea ofa rubordinate power is the idea o f  a lo-divinity, but a genuine ons, at 
least axording to the pgsns. assuming that i t  is the iden o f  a genuine pweror c a w . *  
Therefore, when we psititthe f m s  and pwn of Scholastle philosophy as eauully 
cflicaeiovr entities, as do ths Scblanisr Umnwlm. .K can easily fall into the s m o f  
admining lomehing divine in all ths bod& mund vr and thm find ourwlveradopt~ng 
pganirm out o f  our mpn for Scholnrus phnlmophy As he puo it: -'ifwe wume this 
f d w  OplnlOO o f  the philor~phm, which \Ye mng W WY. that bod#- th81 
rumound us am the rms causes o f  the pl-3 and ills we feel. rearan rssms a lome 
de- to justmfy a religion similar to thplof the p g m '  Thtx aceording 10 
Malebnnche, is wiw is danpmus abut the philosophy ofthe w imts .  
However, if we do not arrvme the Scholastic view of the natural world, m n  
d o e  not Isad vr to paganism. Reason, according w Mdebranche, lepds us ratherto 
occas#onalirm. lfwe follow -on over aurmnfuxd #ndustionr h m  nmx orpsrisnsc. 
we w.11 vnderstnnd Ulat thns can be only one- c a w  - God H m  Malebranche 
makes the wnritlon hom his moral w his mstlphyrical objecnom to ths Scholastic 
phllorophy, where hearguer thst God IS the only pouible me caw. Malebranshe's 
argument for Gad as the only ponibls true uure relics on the rejection ofthe possibility 
that either ted -a  or minds fan move bodia. In hir rejection ofthe possibility thst 
bod,- can move themwlvn, Maleb-he follawr the CMesian mneeption of  msner as 
entirely pauivs. He witsr: "It is slsor IhA no body, large or small. hm the p o w  w 
m o e  itself A mountain. a how.  a m4 a w i n  of sand, in shon the tiniest or lugst  
Nisolu M.lrbnnsh+ TT d Ed. Tho"", Lenand PTI 01- 
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body conceivable d o n  not have the -r to mwe iself '* ARer rejecting the 
pmsibiliry that bodies can m v e  themwl-, he VLI the Cartesian dieincum bstwm 
body sod mind to inquire h u t  the p o w  o f  mind to move body. observing that whn we 
examins ow ideaof finite minds, w lee that thm is m n e z x w  mnnsnion b m m n  
their wlll and the motion of any body. He wdta: *We must thereforemnsbde, if we 
wrh  ro -n aceording toow 11ght.s. LPt UKTr is ahIuteIy no mnnd created that can 
move a body as a orpnncapls s a w .  jw as 11 har besn said thu ne body could move 
iself-" Finally, Malebrmshe I& to the idea o f  God as a porsible came of M l y  
motton. Thz idea ofGod ~mdiffmnr hom the id- o f  body or fin,* minds, for when we 
thmk o f  the idea o f  God, an mnfinitely perk t  and so"4yenIly all-poverful being we 
know that there is a necessary -stion between H i r w i i a  - 
- ~t is nmpossble for Hnm to will that a body he moved and forthe body to remain 
unmoved Thus. despite what wr wnsn senn to tell us. i t  is only G d r  will, and not 
Rnlte minds or other Mia. that sm move bodies, and a w n 1  caws  ( m l  c a w .  
those nnfened hom eonfused rsnre sqxrimce) are not real sPwr  as the Ssholan~er 
would ruggat: they ace merely m i o d  caw, hmee not causally eflicsciola. 
ARer establishing that God is the only pnnible mr caw,  Malebranshe p m s d  
to elati* his rejection ofthe pnn~bility Ulsl finite minds could move bodies. His 
rejestlon ofthir pmribiliry rau on his mce@on of t k  reWonship between bwledge 
and the powerto act Aeeading to Mdebmhe, me must know how to do mething m 
order to k able to do it. Since ws do mt h o w  how the process of d - p h y n c a l  
causation oceun. my wi l l  (as a 6nlts mud) to mow my arm, for sxsmpk. c a m t  
po~ribly k t h e  mr rwv o f  my m u m s  movym551 He writer- 
Far how wuld we move ow m s ?  To move hem, i t  is wcesaq to have 
animal rpiriu, U, wnd h m  through eemn nsna  towtd csrtnrn muwler 
~n d e r  to i n f l a t e d  contract them, for 11 is thus that t h e m  atlsehed to 
them 15 moved. or aswrdtne a the omnlw o f  some othen. il is still not 
b o w  how um WN And we & ths~ ma who do not know t h l  
thsv hasc spplnrr. me a d  musslcr mow thetr arm,. and s\cn mow 
them w th  morc r r ~ l l  and w than t h e  who b o w  snnm) bea 
lhcrcfore men w l l  to movc &or arms and ml, M er ablc snd h u -  
how to move them If a man sanmt Wn = t ~ ;  Y ~ I &  down, at I& he 
knows uhet mu" be done to do w, but there ~q no man uhu knous uhat 
m m  be done to mose one ofhar 6 n ~ ~ b v  mean- ofanlmrl rpntr How 
t k n  could men mms lhetr m r 9  " 
Not only is it me that ws are m t  the mr -of the m-ment ofour own 
am$. but Malebranshe also wa a mntradicfion in the vezy possibility of our being able 
to move OUI own arms He Ands ths sonmdict8on in the pmsibility that God could 
bestow Hns powsr to move bodies on men or angels, or that our apparent -to move 
ovr arms nr arms pour r  The conmadiction rests on his ~dmtification e f W s  p o w  
with His wlll According to Mal&mche, since O d  4s nll-powem1 (i.e., l t  0s a 
conmdiction that He should wil l and that what H e  
not require any i m m s  to an In this sense, God's -r is n&ntisal with Hir will 
Thm to k t o w  His power upon a crated k i n g  would be to bestow the eflieasy of His 
wil l  upon tbnr king. However, to bestow this causally efficacious Divine will is to do 
nothing more than for God to wil l that whenevn a -n wills L m m  his arms. for 
example, then his anns asnully move In this case two w l l r  mnsw thc wll of God and 
that ofthe prran. Which ofthe rwo wills is the mu caw o f  thc body's movement? As 
we have - t h m  is s neccuary saMsstian between God's will and &I- He wills 
to happen. Whst is happnlng in rhs ins- is that whm the p ~ n  willr that the W y  
be moved. God wills that the body k moved In lbir ru5 God is the m e  c a w  ofthe 
body's movement while the pmon's will is only the acarional (and nonsffi-iom) 
cause of this m o m m  Thus, God cmmt s m - c a t e  His powcrm move bodies !s 
created beings since lo do w, IS m m l y  to will that what thsy will to happen a f w l l y  
ascurs (whlsh 8% miftly rpnLlng m t  to eommunime any pover a all). But ru- 
that despite the w i n g  sontrsdiftion, God could anlully communicate His powsrto a 
created bemg so thatthe p e ~ n  i  the ahovs example is n m e  and not an occarional 
cause of the body'r moment.  Malebranche's p i t i a n  is hat  svn, ~f we wne L g m t  
the ~mpornble, fhat God could wmmunisoV His p o w  to thir p m n .  thm there is e m  
n conmadistion in holding that the a-nt, mncffieaciom power ofcrested k ings to 
move bodies could be a M e  pow. l fwe  gant that the pm tn thc shove example ir 
the lnrs s a w  of the body's movement thm. in the pame way that Gd &owed this 
power upon thir p m n .  God wu ld  alu,communim His -rL meate and annnhilate 
bodlcr to thn pm. This implication places anyone who sill bl& that the person in 
the above example i r a  mr s a w  of the body's movmenr in  the awlovard porition of 
havnng to hold that thir m e  pnon wuld be the aue c a w  ofthecreation and 
desmftion ofthe u n ~ w n c  Malsbnnshe's point i n  d i n g  lhse conwdictianr Is to 
show that the only possible rme eficient cause 8s God. As Maleb-he w'm: 'There 
18 Ulercfore only one ~cngls aue Godand one single c a w  t h a n  rmly r -. and [...I 
one should not imagire chst what an effect IS IU mr caw=. Gad annot even 
communzcate His povertosrsatum ~f we follow the lie ofrasm; He -mt make 
true caurer ofthm, He ~ ~ o t  make them gods "I' 
Although Lribnnr. in his comrpwdare with W e b h e  (1679). does 
rpscifisally mentnon M a l b c W s  m.tique ofthe cancepc ofcausaoon. he dm 
demonmate an approval ofUur sonofcritique with hsr a p p o ~ l  ofMalsbnnshe'r 
conclusion that bodies do wt. m i n l y  spaking act upon us." This fact places Leibniz 
more on the ride o f  Malcbnnehs than on lh% heride ofthe Sholastistiss or t k  onhodox 
Cartesians. Homer ,  he also v-ly h i m  h L  alUaugh he agrees uirh Malebrsmhe-r 
sritncirmr of Dsxartu, MalebramWr ocuuionalim doer not go farenough. Lnbnnr 
~vnter- -I belie- that you have go= only halfway and that ail1 other mnwquemr can 
be drawn than thore whwh you have made In my optnion it fo l low that maner a 
romethtng d i t l m t  horn mere memion, and I klneve, balk, th.1 this can be 
demonmafed*'" At this poinl thew g m r a l  sritis~rmr of Mslebmhs's ocfaslonal!rm 
rematn vagw However, by the tnme o f t k  m.ting of Ue D i w ~  on MWohwiss and 
rubwquent cornpondem with Amoinc Amauld (1686-87). ar Lsibnnr develop his 
own philo4ophisal pantion his criticisms bsMm mush mMe spfitic and clearly 
amsulared 
Chapter 11: Leibnir'r Philarophical DeveIqmem 
This chapter offen an -un of* hirmry o f  Lsibnir'r philarophisal 
develapmem~ a m i o n  to oeensionslirm and thmugh his conhontat#on with Amnuld. 
If is dsvided into t h  psm. The 6rX p R  covers Ue Disco- on MN~hvsics mdths 
early p n  ofkibnlz's rubrequsm correspondme with Amauld Tk second prt deals 
wth Lsibnir'r Uw&t u ~t develop ~n ths latter part of his -p4eoe with 
Amauld. Thne a sdarmibls dswnon tnthe fomrpondencs with Amadd berwesn 
these nw periods. The I m  pan ofthe chspcer nhowr the ~nflusnse of Malebmhe and 
the implet of Amauld m Lenbniz'r most Datwe philosophical wrkr. 
Pam I: The Divourw on MepDhvricr md Early Leibniz-Amauld Compondsnse 
Although Leibnir's mmpondenss with Amauld (16-90) swntually leads to a 
dnrusrion of oscarionalirm. i t  don not been with this discmion. IMd ~t hednr 
wrh the summary of Lnbnir'r 'rhm disco- on mepphyrisr' that he untm Amauld 
VIB the Lsndgravs E m  urn He-Rheinfslr. Thls summsry m n r i s  of llnle mom than 
the wstion M i n e  fmm whnt is mw lolow ar Leibnids Disco- w MRB~h~sics 
13. Since the individual m e p  of each -0 mminr once a d  for all 
everything lhrt will ~ e r  happsn to him, one m in it Bc oprron pmfs  
or -0s for the n t h  of each e m f  or why one cvem has occurred 
rather Ulan a n o h .  But there rmthr. thou* ssrtain. are nwsnklsrs 
mntnnpent, being bswd on t k  free will of& and of creamre* 11 is me 
thnr there UP always rruons for lhetr chance, but they insllne without 
necewtaung " 
Unlike the rhon summary lhrt he rent w AmsvlL the mmplele t m  of the 
MeLl~hvricr offen an elaboration, sxplanation, and jWification ofthis pmporition and nI 
cr likely that, ~f he had -id the full D ~ r o v r w  on Metaohvrie, then Amuld would 
probably no1 have objeevd U) this pmpo~iurn in the way that he &d. Howevsr, this doer 
not mean that l k i r  mmpoode~xs is P mere waste of pprsince. as \K shall ye, 
Leibntr's dialogue with Amuld sssmr to have prompted sde~lopment inthc 
philosophy of Leibnk -ialIy m iu relation w k~bniz'~thoughu about 
wwsionabrm 
Arnauld, in his initial respotwe w k ibn iz  SDtn that he is higktmd a d  rhoeked 
by Leobnlz's short d i ro-  He pslu out m i t i o n  I3 for sntic~sm, velng i t  ar a 
threat to human and Divine medan. Amauld nrgws that, ifthir poporition were me 
and everything thaf will cwr happmto Adun is therefore -Pined 10 hnr individual 
eoneep, once Gad decides to create Adam thrn all other h m  wens would he p"- 
determmned by AdunP (qua k t  penm) individval mnecpl w, that M hmam would 
have any hgdom and even Gad would m t  have my power over la. As Amauld wilsr: 
Ifthat is lo, ood w me lo create [or MI creak Adam, but supporrng he 
wished IO create h1m.1 evervrhine that has hammed rum and uill ever 
happn w the humsn-mx was aid 8s obligedio happsn though n mae 
than fatal necnnty. For the indtvidual concept o f  Adam mntlined the 
conwqvense that he would have w, many shnldren. snd the tndindual 
consent of-h of the% chtldren weMhlne that the" wu ld  do snd all the 
sh&n that rhey wwld have. and.% on  There.. therefore no mars 
lhhcq ~n God rcgardtng .It that. supponng hc unshed lo create Adam 
than ~n marmalnlng h a  Gcd uiu hsc. rupportng he wrhed w ereaa me. 
not to crcalurr a natumeapblc of thought ' 
The early psn of Leibn~r's comrpondnse with Amauld ir centered pmund their 
respeclive diragrammn aban this popattion. In the follaw.ng Isnsr. knbnnz wiles 
hael ,n defenv ofthir proporillon which he  mide en to have been unfairly anreled. 
He arguer that Amauld'l s"tiasm is misplaced since i t  sonf- 'abrolua neewity' 
with 'hypaheiesl wssutty'; II fails to disingvirh "bstween what God is free to do 
absolutely and what he harobltgsd himselfw do by vim o f d n  dsnnonsalrudy 
d e n  '" According to k ibnm we mun mt think ofGod as a -n whose decisions 
" U p  O(0.p 15) 
" U p  I31G.p 18) 
depend upon the sireumrwcn in whwh he finds himself Thus, although Gd'r first 
deeiriar. is., Le sr~~t ian  of  Adam, is m-led fume e m u ,  with svcphing 
concerning Adam's pmtsrity, this dosr muling to diminish God'r medom. An 
addit!onal poblem mth  Amauld'l &jeerion is lhat it m& the mi&e of falxly 
sepamting0od's will into reparale aeu of  willin& as Ulough they are not all intcmlated. 
W e  must not mal;e the mistake of Ihinking ofGod's will m c-5 Adam spart horn His 
\all to c m l e  Adam's portsrity as He sees fit. God'r crunon ofAdam wr not the 
sreatlon of a vague and indetmninsle Adam; that is, Gd did  no^ in& could nM. 
realize an insomplste concept o f  A h .  Innend, Gd shore n pvlieulardnerminats 
Adam whmmmplcv concept includer among nher prrdisatu also that of hawng in 
the cornsofume a parusular pmtnily, God I r s p f  c b m g  him is already tnking his 
posterity nnta sonridentian and is ehmmaring bnh at the m e  time In this I carmot 
understand how there may be any hrrm. And 8 f  he were to aa DM-, he would nm 
act as God"" Thus, instead of consavmg ofGod having nwnemus unrelated wills, 
\%e must soncstve of  God as havingn cornprehsnuvs w l l  regarding the whole ader of 
the unlvem. Thrs will includes the nha- of  will, thore regarding whatsver earn  
into this u n i v e ~  Thsre pamcular XU of will differ horn the mmp~hcnsive ~ 1 1 ' 9 1  
the rimtion ofa t o m  I m M  a fmm a e-in newpoint differs from is ground plsn''" 
Yn lhsrs wllr nre not rsally -te since thsy srs all an expression of the m e  willed 
"LA p 14(0. p 19). 
"LAP lS(G. P 20) 
wivcrrs '-a each rimtion is an r r p c r ~ i m  o f t k  Leibnnr tak- this hamon). of 
wl l r  as a nigx of W s  m d a n  d perfection. He dta: 
Indeed thr ulvr one 8s. Ihe f w r  uparae m s  of m l l  one hm and Ihs 
morc onc'r r i ew md m s o f  *nil arc compchmJ8re md I~nked logether 
And rnrh oanlsulnran ofurll emlams a conncxlon ulth all the n k r ,  u, 
that they may he h s r m o w ~  to the great- &me very fzs 
horn findm3 rornerhmg rhoclung ~n that, I should thtnk that the opposite 
derrmyr G d r  prfeetmn '' 
1" resp0~6.  A&d explams that, although he wees with mmt ofwhat Leibnir 
has just raid, he docs w t  ISS haw II solves his difficulty since he has am confused 
'hypothetical neeeulty' mth 'ahlute necessity'. I'hw in this lener. Arnauld slsrifi~ 
his objection .'I find i t  merely m g e  that a l l  human wens are a ns-ry by 
hypothetical nesssrity horn this single nurni t ion that God wirhed to stepre A h ,  as 11 
is necessary by hypothetical lrecesritythat then was in the wowold a MIUR capable of 
thought horn the s u ~ r i t i o n  alone that he wished to create me.'- Thus, although 
Arnauld agrees that we muR distinguish b e w e n  what God is free to do ab10111eIy and 
what he has obliged himrl f to do by v i m  of His -our decisions; that we m w l  not 
consaved of God as a p m m  who makn decisions accordiw to the C ~ ~ U M ~ E ~ S  in 
whmsh he fin& hnrnwlt. and that we rnwt not rsparate G d s  xn of will r i m  they are 
all mtemlated, he an11 objesnto the thmmnth proposition in tk summary of  Leihir'r 
'short dnm-'. 
" L A P  I5(Gi.p 20) 
" LA. p I S  (C. p 20, 
LA. t6(G. p 27) 
Arnauld a- with Leibniz on the followng pine- Gad's howl+ of Adam 
when He detemmned lo -15 him contained the knowledge ofeMIyUling that will 
happm to hlrn and hs patmity; and Gad's an ofwi l l  inthe emion  o f  Adam war not 
wprate from His will regsrdtng Adam% pmtenty H m ,  a pmblem still remains, 
r ~ n s s  we rnua still ask whnher the mnncstia, between Adam and ha porvriry exim 
independently ofGod's dcnsn or whether i t  is dcpndsnl vpon God's dsnm rhat is: 
nf r is only as n u)~squsm of  the hes krm whereby God or- 
everythmg that would ha- lo Adam and his pm~enry that God lmmv 
everylhing that would happn e Adam and his pstsnty: or ~f &re exlsu, 
8nds~sndsntlv o f  these k- an i n m ~ t s  and neeeuarv sonnsmon 
k&een ~ d &  on the one hsnd, and what has happened andwill happn 
to him and hnr portPnfy on the other" 
Thus. Arnauld pmmts Lenbnir with a dilemma: It vems mat Leibniz muY either chow 
the first alternative (which he cannot & without directly conWetmng his poporntion 
that the nndividval compt ofsach -n conraim svnythingthnt will happen m hvm) or 
he must chow the vsond allcmativs (whtch. as we will we, is also incompstibls wth 
Leibnir'r th~rteenth paporition) AMuld asrvms t h l  Leibniz will not disagree that 
pasrible things are pnor m God's lice krm. Fmm this 11 follows that "wM is 
conralned in the concept of possible things is mntainal there mdspsndently of d l  the 
free decreer ofGod."' Now. Leibniz alw, holds that God found among possnble things 
a possible Adam who posrsm. amonganha pcdlcntsr, du, that o f  having a psmcular 
portenry. Thus, there IS an inmnsb m-ion (i.0.. indspDdent of snd pior to G d r  
decrees) befwsen this pssble A&. qua pmtble thing and h s  pter i ry However, 
this possible Adam. whom God chap i n  pcf- ID other ~OSPOSPOS~I~ Adamdam. is linked in 
the m e  way to Ur pmmify as the -led Adam since he isthe same Adam 
considered now rs m t b l e  and n w r s  a d .  Here is where Arnauld'r d i f i i ~~ I f y ,  and 
the problem wifh the usondalICmPtive in AMuld's dilemma, lies: Amauld rs a 
theolapan, holds h f  an infinite number of human evens (rmh as Ur Llramt im) have 
happned ar a result o f W r  W u l u  wills But nt then e m s  to be tmpsib lc  lo hold 
that all of thew rhnngr, whish have -4 thmugh the free dss- ofGod, were 
contzlned tn the nndividunl soncepf ofthe pouibk Adam rcwe (as AMuld has j w t  
dcmonrmted) any possible dung must sonfain dl o f  iu predisatsr ~ndepndsntly of 
God's decrees. 
In his replis., kihir a- with Amauld that Ur tirrt all-live lia in 
opposition to h?r I h imn fh  popoodon, fhat fhe umneetims betwem Adam and his 
portc"fy are dependent upon God'$ dec- and forthe reasons that Amauld hasjust 
crplalnsd Howsm, he Qss mf, as Amauld I-. chmss the m n d  aIRmtive 
(that there is an inninas d neceJsav sonncenon h e n  Adam snd his prmerify). 
Instead, Letbniz finds 'wme middle way' to avoid Amnuld'r dilmms. According l o  
Amauld, k ibniz must sh- t k  -nd dtmive since kibnizsonriders the 
nndividual consepi ofAdam as pwible (meaning that amongs an ~ntinits number o f  
possible c o n w  God chose h t  o f  s w s u l a r  Adam). and m i b l e  eoneepU & MI 
depend on the hes dss-of God Howevsr, ascoding lo k i b n i ~  this re~~on ing  is 
flawed since "God's ha dss-, considered as pwibls, m t n  into the somepi ofths 
'*LA p 2s (G. p 29) 
as ib le  Adam. while it ~ ~ U r r s m ~ d e e -  once they beeomeactllal. which -the 
c a w  ofthe acmal ~ d p m . ' ' ~  This sln~m s l l w  Leibniz m avoid Anauld'r dilemma and 
hold that the wmenian bsnnm Adam and his posterity is lnmmis but n neceupry 
tndepndently ofGod's free d e e m ,  Thus, urith God's cho~ceofAdun, all human 
wen% are m a r y ,  nm mainly beeawe ofthe individlsl mnesptof A h ,  but heuuw 
ofGod's somprehenr#ve plans whish bnh enter tnlo the pouiMe individual -*of 
Adam, thus &min ing  the m-pr of ths entire unwerrs, snd whnsh determine eachof 
the mdividual rub- m thtr unnvene. Again, Leibnir points out the coMenion that 
exists among all things because of the intenciationnhipr among W r  wills. 
h the m e  a of  lmm. Leibnii offerr hns hypahesis ofmnmrnium. the 
docmne ofrhs pre-erublished h m n y ,  and his cnl iqw o f  -ionaIim as the% follow 
ham htr thirventh papmition. He m e  
Thc popmition in qumion is o f  very great impomnce and m a i u  a clear 
demonsImti0~ f a  i t  followr that every mu1 8s like a world apart, 
lndepndent of everything exem God: thnt i t  is not only immoMl and, ro 
lo rpeak. ~ncapble of kang wed upm. hut that 11 mom on tts rubnanee 
1ndwat8ons of ewryrh,ng ha! h a m s  to #I Fmm 01 alw, follou, Ihc 
narurr of the mmmme hetucsn subsmen and m~cvlar lv  that 'sf the 
. . 
unman berwesn soul and body." 
Accordnng to Leibno~ the mh mume ef the 'mmmerce betwesn rubrraneer' (ss i t  
fallows fmm this thineenth papmition) lies in opposition m both 'the &nary 
hypothnvr o f  the physwal influmee' uul the 'hypolherir o f - i o ~ l  causes'. The me 
nature of the wmm- MMn ru- doer Mf Eonform fo the hypIhcsis of 
and is only a conwqume of its preceding it da. Mt conform to L e  
hypothesis ofocsasid -s s im,  sgslna lk mcas~malim, God dar not ints- 
#n the ordnnary c o r n  dlk n-I world Insea4 lk rme name of* m m m e  
the m u l l  of the ~ n ( s d  rnivity o f  rubnuneu. As he c- a: 
That a to say, each rubrtanse tr an ex-ion of t k  mnrc wqucme of 
evens in r k  wiveme s s m d n g  Lo the view or relahonship psullsr to iQ 
when- a happens Uut they exin m &en b o n y  mth ar mother. 
and when one rays lhst one subYanes actr upon lhe alkr, lk dtPinel 
expression of t k  parswe o w  dec- and incr~aws in the act~ve one in 
confarmnty with the russsrsion o f  though* s m b r d  by IS consspt. For 
althovgh m l y  rubrt.nce is an expresson of  sveyhing, one a comet  in 
ambuttng lo mr mpracu~+ only the mort distinssve expresslam according 
to is relationshlp:' 
Thus the c a w  ofchange is not a mmr ofwarnt divine ~ntnvntion, but n m a r  of 
the internal astnwly of a rubsuncs. Funkmore, rime all crated bclngs am a continual 
pmducrion o f  L c  one God 'in semdmce with the snme plans and am an u-lon of 
the m e  unwerse or of lk name phenomena' r h q  harmonize exactly among themwlver 
This harmonizing I& ur to believe Uut real tntarubrrantirl camtion susrr and thnt 
one subslance acts upon the 0th- 
b w s  one is a mare &dm -ion than lk heother of the c a w  a of  
the ream" for lk changer, more w les as we nmibvrc maton to the 
vnw l  ra lkr  Ulan lo L s  who* ~sa I...) This is how. sn mv onmion. one 
must d e m a n d  L s  cmmnce bpn;ee;r created s u b s ,  i d  not hom 
n rsal phyrieal nnfluencs or depsndencs, of whwh one can m r  have a 
distinct so-pf9 
This claim I d  leibnir m his sritiqus of-imalirm. The fact that we canna 
have adistinct sencep of ml intcnutamtiai phyrieal iNl- 13. according to Leibnir. 
why many thinkerr, including Mnlsbnnehe and the other orra~iomlisu. haw ban 
oblnged to agree that a d i n n  mmmeree h e e n  mind and body is tnconenvable 
Althouzh a direct commerce betwrrn #mind and body is i K m e i M b k  m a r i o ~ l l i m  io 
not a rsurfastory altsmnt~vs. According to Letbniz, i t  is not a ~.Usficlny alternative 
since it mma m a mninual miracle, nnd rsquiresOod constantly to i n m m  in lhe 
ordtnnry mum of  the n % m I  -Id. Le%nir m i tn :  
i t  intmduces a son o f  mntinual mmr;ls ar tho& God were mmlantly 
changtng Ihs l aw  of Won on Ihe oscaslon o f  Ihe thoughu of rnnndr. or 
changlng the regular murrs o f  the thovgha o f  the mu1 by among tn 8 1  
othrr thoube. un h e  hecaslon o f  !hc moromcna ef hcxl~rr md on 
general as Ulough God were o rd im .1~  to mntervenc in m y  other way than 
bv mamntaxntng each rubrwce m its sou= of acuon and in the laws 
&tabl!rhed for 11 
The hypothis ofeommifvlce or pre-e~lablirhcd hannony is an acseptnMe alternative 
since a "cxplnns ~ w t h l n g  in a coK~ lvnbk  r n m n  and one wonhy ofGod. and which 
even 8 %  conclv~ive and inevilable, in my opinion, wording m the proposition that we 
have just dcmonswtsd."" 
'"WP 65CG.p 57) 
" LA. p 65 (G. pp 57-58) 
" LA. p 61 (0 .  p 58) 
Pan 11: The L.ts ndihz-Amauld Conespmdena and ndibnir'r Philmphisal 
Development 
In the -d psn of  ths ndibniz-Amsuldmnnpmds11~~. the foeus oftheir 
d l ~ u ~ ~ l o n  shifts tmm ndnbnir's thinscmh pmporition lo mom @nerd is- ~ w h  PI UK 
nature ofsoncanitance ar the pmrlablishcd harmony. whetha rum p w s u ~  force 
or power. and the na- of m i ~ s l e s . ~ ~  The diwurrion r h i h  focus ln this way for inthc 
lcncr of Sepumber 28, 1686, PI Lsibniz hadexpefed. Amauld agreed w his thinscnth 
pmposntion. He unter: "11 bibruz's re-1 w s  more h n  mwgh to make me 
deci& to c o n k  to you in gmd faith that I am wirfied by the way you uplam wha had 
at 6m shocked me regarding the concept ofthe individual naturs."' However, he doer 
nor agree to ~ l y t h i n g  that ~uppovdly followr fmm it In this leta he objcsa to a 
number of other owrues that havecome up nn the sonerpondsnfe. including Leibnir'r p 
ertablirhed h m y  and hypothesis of concomiun~e. Thus bsgins the -nd psn of the 
Leibnnz-Amauld correspond-. 
Howevn; befom we asturlly p& to the ensuing dialogue b*wrrn Lsibniz 
and Arnauld, I should p u e  w p i n t  om thn Leibiz's cnfique o f  -iwdi~m. PI i t  is 
stated in the early p n  afthe ndvbniz-Amwld co"(aoderrs, is not acsurno. His 
cnuquc is thmfars w u s 4 1 ,  and fails10 distinguish adequately his prsinablirhed 
harmony fmm aasrional~rm. Leibnnz'r arymcnt thaosss~ianalism q u ~ r e s G d r  
constant intervention m the n a m l  order or, st lean PI farm Malsbnnehe is sonssmsQ 
inaccmls. M a l e h h e .  the acsionalist d u h m  work Leibnir clearly knew, did not 
"Cf m e r . L , ~  111 
hold that God rrguldy in- m ths n.fural wdn. 1- according to 
Malebranshe. God nsrs i rn  his paver thmugh a ftw general ar ofwill. In Ihc 
Elucidar8onr of The Sureh h T M h  Malebmck explim that 
God does mt multiply his volitions w i t h  -; He nl- sfls 
through the a m p l a  and thnr 8s why he uwr the coll8sion of bodis 
to move them, MI b- Umr nmpact IS h l u t s l y  net- for thsfr 
mot-on. as our sen= ell ur, but besavv with lmpast as the occaslan for 
the mrnvnisatnan o f  mnim. very few W d  Iawr are Nedsd to 
pmdws all the admirable effects w -.Y 
And in The %arch aRer Twh i twl f  he wtsr: "He mover all thinp, and Ulvs podwe 
all the sffau that we h a w i n g  bessvlc He dw, willed cmnin l a w  necordnngto 
whish motion is ~ommuniuled upon thecollision of Ma; snd b v w  thew laws are 
eficasiour, they an whereas bodin ~ a ~ ~ t . e t . ~ '  Thus, with the impact of two bodin. 
bodyAandbodyB,bodyBisnOtmwedbybodyA Inrtead.bodyBirmavsdbyGod'~ 
w l l  However, God's will i s  a general will. and i t  is identical wth the l a w  o f  MNR; 
that a. God dosr not dmrenly and panieularly will that the wmnl body w e .  rub, the 
body's movement 8s a -11 of Gad's general w l l  that when any bodies 'eollidc' ~n a 
certain way then a swain mount ofmotion will he 'aanrfsrrrd'. Although God'r will is 
merely a g s m l  will and issfi-tcw wthout any intsrd8sry. God- awe bodin 
to move through His g-1 will r i m .  ss we have seen m Chapter I, His will nessrmly 
IS c a ~ ~ ~ l l y  e f i - i od6  I f  lus (sLs M.lebnnehe's ~ ~ a b o a b o t  G d as aning 
thmugh g e m 1  will rathathan pnisular unlsrvmtiom in Ur mmnl or&r mi~wly 
then Malebranshe's o c r u i d i u n  is W y  diffmnt from Lenbnlz'r pmrtsblirhed 
harmony, in the way (hat Leibnir explains ha hypothnrr Io this poinl. Thus. .gains 
Leihnmc Malsbranshs'r ~~~b, ionslnsm daes nn qutre Gad's c-tant intervention in 
the MN~I order and 11 is thnsfors n n  any lers wonhyofOod Ihan kibnir'r a*n 
docmne of a pr-rablirhed harmony. 
One of A d d 3  obidons ~n the -d psrt of  his wmpmdewe with 
Lenbnl~ not r u ~ ~ a n g l y ,  8s directed st thir vcry #$rue of  Leibmz's ninsirm o f  
acssmmalmrm ss i t  is r n d  with his aun dosmne of a pre-stablinhe.4 harmony. 
Arnauld suggests (hat Leibnir'r prpertnbli~kd harmony i r  identical with oecarianalim, 
that hc is merely '.mying ths rame thing. in other w d . " "  He makn thir rugge-ion in 
response to Leibnir'r account ofapparsntmmd-body infcranion. Leibniz claims that 
although my arm d r r  when 1 w l l  i t  m d r .  it ir not my will which c a s e s  my a m  c 
move Instead, when I unll w nt~x my m, my body IS ~nanf i  10 Ihat my arm rim. 
Bodies are moved by their own law. there being m -1 intermon betMsn mind and 
body. Apparent mind-bdy i m m o n  (s.g. my arm's mwemsnl when I will it w mwe) 
I s  the rsrult ofthe h m o n y  koucen rubrtsnees whichGod har ntablished &win to thnr 
apparent interaction. This aa'oum of  apparent mind-body ~ntenetion. according w 
Arnauld, is the rune as L c  -implist's m m f  it is the m e  as saying that "my will 
is the ocsarional cause of the movement o f w m  and that God is the IU cause of 
How are th- rssouns the m e ?  Leihw'r dosuine might seem to be different 
from oscasianaltrm becam i t dan  nn nnvolw W r  somtan intcrvemion in the nsnnal 
order. Horn, as Amnuld conenly p i n s  ouI.''thsy [the -ionaIiJDI do not claim 
that God h r  that in time thmugh P new act of will w h h  m e  I wirh 
to ralu my arm, but by that single w of l h e e t m l  uill, whneby he has W P M  to do 
everythnng which he has fmewsn h t  i t  would be -ry 10 do, ~n ordsrthat the 
univenc rnkght be whst he deemed i t  war to he."" Wtth thir . s s m  reading o f  
occasionalism #n mind the nmilarir?. bmuecn Leibn~r's p c J r a b l i s M  harmony and 
Malebranche'r occasionalism bpomss .-at. As Amauld writs: "Now, is that not 
the substance of yow marks when you ray that the c a w  o f  the movement ofmy m, 
when I wirh to ra i v  if is 'the wonderful but vnhiling harmony bstwem thmngr. which 
comer fmm the fast that God tmk 11 into conridsntnon in dvanee whm he made his 
deetrion about thir suerruimofall thsngr 80 th univnu'?* Amauld p i n s  out thaS 
~f we look for a real cause in Lenbntz's - b l a h  
anlsulated x, far), we find that Leihnir not agree rhat my mw m l l  is the ml caw 
of my m ' r  movmem nor my 01 any nherbody the real c a w  of my a m ' s  movement. 
The only remaining option 8% thac i t  is this 'eonsidation by Cod' which ir th real c a w  
of my arm's movement Tlls m t  ofAmsuld3 idenlifimion o fLe ih# r ' r  p-erublished 
harmony with ossasimalnrm ns simply a mattsrof word-rubdtution. Ar Amauld wnw: 
-Now, you yourwlf call lhir eonridention by Ood 'his decision', and dcsto8on and w l l  
are the ramc thmg: thsrefore, aemrdingto yo4 every time I wish 10 mi15 my arm, i t  is 
God's will which is the rsal and efficient cause o f  this m o y s m n ~ ~ '  
In Rsponr to Armuld Leibnfizeladfies his differ- fmm the oeeprimlirts 
thmugh a new asmunt o f  mimcla L k n t  hom d!at ofthe D i r a u w  on ~ s ~ o h n i c r . "  
In the Dirouns. Leibniz wmfe hI ?he miracles and exvandinrry ~Uervsntionr of(iod 
have this peculimty - lhat they cmmt he f a ~ n  by the w o n i n g  of m y  crested rpint, 
m matter how enltghtened, bssuae the d in iml  undsnmnd~ngof the general wdcr 8s 
beyond all r w h  spiritsi' whish clum, a~ S- Bmm points WL "makes it a- that 
miracles for t k  author of Ihe D z s c o w  are like contingency in Spi- - s mere 
apparanse due 10 human ignorance and without any barn in  the namre ofthings '* 
Hew, in response to Amauld, Lsibnir redefines a miracle. He wriw "God prformr a 
miracle whenever he dur romahingthnt ex& Ihe f m  whish he har glven U, 
creatures and mintlinr in them.'*' In thnr re"=. evsn miracles do not occur lhmugh a 
new act of God's will. since they w he included i n  His general plan and y e  $1111 be 
miraculaur. T h q  according 10 Leibniq the -ionaI1sIs"iDnOdu~5 B miracle whwh #s 
no l a r  one for k i n g  eontnnusl. For it rssmr to me Lat the concept o f  the miracle dosr 
nal consist o f  rarity.& He provides an example to clarify his new secovnt of miracles. 
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I f  God were to cavwa body to continue in  a circular maim afler bemg r e 1 4  fmm a 
mming sling d m  that would be a m i w l e  rim, according to n a N d  laws. the body 
should eonnnus along s m i g h t  line u aungenl when r e 1 4  form the rltng 
Funhemore, !fGod were to caw th~s to happen e ~ ~ y  time a body 8s re lead  horn n 
sling in thlr way, then this movement would r l l l l  count as mirasvlalu rinee thls 
movsment would sill be insrtpiicsble by mhml m-. In f q  if the mrutnustian of 
any movnnmtueeed L c  force o f  t k  bodies involved, then the continustion ofthk 
movement 1s a m  miracle. The osusionalirtr hold that Ood moves all bodies in h is  
way, that is, thatthe eonn'nultion o f  the movement ofnll bodies exceeds the f- of the 
bodin involved sin- God- all mmment  thmugh his p e n 1  wills whlchm 
ldcntisal with the laws of-, st- they hold that bod~sr po- no powerto L W ~  or 
maintain any movemew st all. Lsibniz on the nhcr  hand, holds that "bodily rubsmcs 
has the force to eontinus t t r  changes -ding m the laws that God has placed #n i s  
nature and mamnmnn thns'"' Here 81 becomes clearthat lhns is a real d~fle-c 
berwesn ossa~nonalirm and -tsblirhed harmony According to the oscas~onalnts. 
there are no c a d  f- or p o w  in created thnngr. According to Lsibnts created 
h n p  porres eavsal farce and powr oftheir mvn 
The emphasb on n n N d  po- that is neceuimred by this new account of 
mlraslcr, and Ihe precise acsountofLeibnir's d i f ferem fmm arorlonslism arr srident 
m Lenbnlz'r reply, m the l a m  psrtof k i r  mmrpondmcc. to Amaul<r quntion about 
how the rod coma to fa1 p i n  Leibniz'r ear l inanempto an- this question 
-L& p 116(C.p 93) 
~nvolvcd an identification ofthe monad as an expression o f  the universe As Lsibniz 
wrote ln the sarlier part ofthsirmncspondcn~e: '"To be lure, -in Ihoughw (ICCYT ID 
us when there are cntsin bodily movemenu, and -in bodsly movmsnts occur when 
we have certain thoughn: hut i t  is beesus each rmbsturs is an expession ofthe whole 
unlvem aRer in own man=, and this a p n r i o n  o f  the universe, which ~ O n d N t s r  a 
movemeor m the body. IS &ap a p i n  Y) faras the sod is fo-mcd.* Thir answer 
involves an account of prception that m s  m require an nndepndent and objective 
world. Thir answer 8% similar la kbn i r ' r  account ofsxpres~on in Ihe 
there thus -Its fmm each prnpstivs of the mi-. as i t  k ram fmm 
a artain position, a r u m  whbsh e m  the u n l v e ~  in confomtty 
to h a t  prnpsst8ve. ~f God resn tit m render hnr -1 effective and m 
pmduse that rubrturce. And since W r  prnpctive Is dmys we, our 
pcrccpllanr are alwa,r mr. 11 a our judmcnb. whlch come hm 
ounel\n, uhlch &ewe us I I Ihne phmomcna malmaln a -1" ndcr 
uhbch conform9 our narwe or, rom sped., m the world w h ~ h  IS wlhm 
s'-' 
If this assount 8s not-ially -1 m rsvcntrrmhcenhvy philaophy, if the 
underlynng smsture o f  h b n i r ' r  aecovnt of perceprionr and phmomena wem to srms 
that phenomena conform to us instead ofbeing in  some \uoy podused by us. i t  will 
rhonly be otherwise for Lenbnir In the lann pan o f  the Leibnir-Amauld 
correspondence, Leibniroffnr an -unt with some ruMlc, b u t r i ~ i f i m I ,  diFkrenecs. 
Here, m mponre to Amauld'n question about Uu saw of pin, Leibnir wn-tsr: 
I malnmin that c y q  subrranse contaim in  is prevm slate all is mn 
past and fum. and wen e m  the whole univene = d i n g  to is 
mmr of vtpw, since mthnng is so f a  m o v e d  from other thnngs that r 
doc5 not have mmmunlcollm vllh Urm, and on pmru lv  arcodng lo 
~ h c  onnexnon utth the psnr of le b*, of vhseh 11 8s a mnc ~mmsdtate 
exorcumn and mnwoventlv noth~nc a c u n  lo 11 excea h m  IS own 
de;nh~and~by vim oi ru bwn la&, pmvided that one ad& God's 
eoncorn. But i t  perssivn &r Ihingr becam h exper* Ulem 
nacurallv, having been on.nsly emrd an 5uch r uay thal ~t can 
rrmcqucntly do u, and a&pl #=If lo 01 ar, n - q ,  md !I IS on tho$ 
obl.utnon ~ m d  horn thc h n n ~ n n  Ulnt *re c o n s n ~  what ar called 
- .  
me actnon ofom SUM- upon-an~&.~ 
Here the basic strunurr of  Leibnir's aecomt ofaw pxepionr s e m s  m be reverred In 
agecmmt with the new emphasis on lumd powers tha coma hand-,-hand with 
Leibniz'r new ascount of miracles, his xcomt of penzqtion r h i h  u, the point witem 
phenomena are now sonridered to be p m d d  by the monad 8UeIC Thnr new CEOUnt of 
perception as an asuvityofenpression &t belongs to the monad iuslf, and Leibnir'r 
new empharmr on natwsl p o w  cominw beyond Leibnir's mmpndcnee with Amuld 
and are svndent in Lsibniz'r l a m  phnlarophisal r t ~ t m s  in such works as B 
Svnem(1695). On Nature luelf(1698). NewErravs on Human Undnrwding(17043, 
and Lsibn~r'r mrrsspondsnss wth Samuel Clark (1715-16). 
Pan 111: The Finn1 Smge in Lnbnir'r Philaophieal Developmmt 
The find slap in Leibnir'r philosophid dcveloprnm a mulrsd by Leibnlr'r 
mnereased confidence m hns ctitiqueofasnr~nralim and emphasis on M N ~  powerr. In 
this tinal nage. the gRrm innumccof his cmpnrdenss with Amuld and the i m p s  of 
his disqeemem with M d m k  beenne endent. Here, Leibnir'r nwsmphasns on 
naNral power a NII pasntedas following horn his new acwwn of miracles (and 
dtfferencs hom Malebnwhe) m the m e  way as I" the IaRerpM of the Lelbnlr-muld 
correrpondenss. The influence ofAmauld and impan o f  M a I h h e  me fuiher 
cmphasnud by Ihs factthat Lnbnnzconsidned plblishung his sompondsnce with 
Amauld where, as we hsvs - Leibnir d i m s  his true d i K e  horn Malebnnche 
thmvgh Amauld's pornpting with his A New S- o f  the Na- and the 
Communicaoon of Subslames. as wll ar the Umon Be- the Soul and the B d l  
(1695). tk fist plblic saternemof his phtlosophical poritlon. 
By tk Ilme fhat Leibnm wote the New Svstm he had dirsovsred htr true 
difference fmm ths -8onslins Thm, ~n ths New S m m ,  Leibnnz'r position on 
powsr m naNre. pmcpnan, a d  his critique ofocca~ionslirm mainseonrirtsnl with hin 
rtatemsnts inthe lsnerp~nofhisearrapondena with Amwld(1686-93). In them 
he -e his rewctitiqusofarasimlim as leading to ths domine of  prs- 
ertabltrhsd harmonypnd his eonceptuslizatim ofprception as an activlty o f  sxprerr~on 
which belongs to each m o d  In this t m  Leibniz explains ths5 although he m e p u  the 
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basis dam made by L s  mxasionalim that thnr canna be any real iruemdon in the 
crested world, he di- \nth the heianal isu'  ~ n s l u r i m  t M  t h e  IS m paver in 
nature and that oad is Lerefm the only me caw.  A p i m  this claim he wiles that 
problems such a a-t mind-bady i M n M o n  are no( solved 
merely by d i n g  tm= of a pmrl came and d i n g  in what is called the 
dam er m h m a .  To do thin mthout offenne sm 0th" emlanalon i s  
pmpcly rpnking to have r e s o w s  to a minsie. fm philosophy w t  mvrt 
try to dve a -n which will show how things a x  bmu@ abwt by the 
Dnv~ne W!&m m eonformny wth  the pen#sular m c s p t  of tk rublea ~n 
Thus Lsibnir -nu his dosmne of p s 4 l i r h e d  b o n y  as follmnng hom his 
cntlqus ofoecandirm, for keeping the -iondistIts claim that t h m  is M real 
lnteraenan mthin thecreated wdd and -ngthc claim that Gcd is theonly me 
cause naurally lea& one to tk hypoUlerir ofa ps-blirhsd b m y .  As Leibnir 
king constrained, thnr m admit that i t  is lmporrlble for the ml or any 
other m e  rub- to receive somslhing horn wthout. except by the 
divine omnipotence. I w led insensibly to an opinton whish rlrrprired 
me. but which wemr inevmbls, and whnch has in fan very great 
advantages and very agnlcant b u m s .  This is tha w man say thar 
God has on'@nally nsarsd the soul. and every other red unity, #n rwh a 
way thar sverythmng ~n 81 musf arise hom iu o m  "atwe by a &ect 
ponronenry wth  regard IO itself, yet by a prfect C D C D / O ~ I ( Y  m Bmgr 
wthout iJ 
Funhermore, Lenbnir'r somptuplinuon o f  prscpnm as an aniviry ofeipnring what 
I s  psrce~ved whlch belongs to each monad also followr tmm Btr rmphc.8~ on natural 
power He -.la- 
And thus, dnce our internal sensations [. ] u e  mmly ~~ whish 
follow vpon m e m l  evem n bensr, are ra l l y  appuuvsr or like well- 
ordered d m $ ,  i t  follow that thrw perceptions intermi to the soul iaelf 
mme to ~t thmugh IU mw onglrul conrtltutlon. that is to say. through i o  
rcpsuntaave mrwe I ) lhnr MNle harnng k e n  mrsn 11 hom In 
creatton ad mh$tltunng 8s tnl~vndual character It tr t h ~ r  that maker 
earh rubrwse ~ a n v m  themtore untvmc accwstclr ~n nu o w  w a y  md 
ascordnng to a definite poim of wew. And lhe percevionr or exprerrnon 
of enema1 things reach the soul at the -r time by nmr of 16 awn 
laws, as on a world .pan, and as if Uere exnned nnhing bm God and 
luelf" 
Lsbbnir's emphnrxs on n a m l  power sl mnnmed with his new account of mirscln and 
cntneirm of oscarionalirm is perhaps even m m  explicit m his Clarification of the 
Difficulties whnch MI Bnvle hnr f d  in Ihs New Smcm." Against Bayle'r claim that 
ossasionalirm doer not q u i r e  n miracle bssavv 11 mmly  q u i r e s  a few pneral Dnnne 
acts of will mher than a m -  interventcon in the natural order (a familiar cntls~rm 
fmm the Leibnnz-Amuld carerpondmee), Lnbniz sxplieitly somscu his cnticlrm of 
occasionalism with his nnp4ms.b on n a m l  paver and his nov account of mirsslcl. 
Lenbniz-r response u, Bayle is not ral ly n e w  It 8s rtmply a mpnntion o f  htr rerponw to 
Amauld. With a growing swfidnre in his criticiyn and em&hSis on 118-1 - 
Letbnb wnter: 
in my oplnlon that [-ionaliyn's quimmcnt that God act w l y  h u @  
gmenl laws] don not ruffiss to m o v e  the miraeln. Even if God should 
do thir sontinuowly, they would m t  sssss being mirscler. i fwe take thir 
term. not m the m ~ u l a r  unw of a rare and wonderful thine. but in the 
ph~lorophieal w&f that w h ~ h  exceeds the powers of =real& being% It 
1s mt enough to say that God hnr mads a. general law. for bermder Ue 
desm here is also neeesury a n a d  msans of eanying i t  out, tha 8% dl 
that hap- must nlu, be cxp(aincd &ugh the n a m  whish Gad give ro 
things The l a w  o f  natwe are wt U) arbiwry and ID i n d i f f n n n  
pople imagine.* 
Lsihniz's nitiqvc of-iionaliun. sill in ths genemi form ofthe latter v a f  
the Lenbnir-Amauld cone~pondsnce (where oscsriomlism is rejected on Ihe gmvnds that 
~t dents the erlrtsnsc of power in the nalwal world), receiver enended -men1 in his 
On Nature ltwlf (1698) " In thnr l ea  Leibniz begins h8s nitisinn ofaewi-lism by 
asltlng whetk the Divine will &to% upon m t s d  things an 'extrimis denmmstian' 
(an enmal  power) or an 'internal law' (-me vemp of power which end- within 
them) from whlsh thew actions and passions follow Theac-~mIiru(le~bn~z 
explicttly m a  Mnlebnnche) hold Ihat the Diww will benowr Ihls -only u an 
-eminac dmmination'. In o m i t i o n  to l h e o e u r i o ~ l i ~  Leibniz holds bl the 
Dlvine will benow this power ar an ~intsmal law' He provides !hree -m for the 
rqectnon of mere 'eminsic denomination' Fnnk nfwe mume (with the aecnsionaliru) 
thaf God's wl l  doer not bmpn some veslig of His power to cmated Ihingr, thm. since 
there must bs aeonnrtion hnwen c a m  and e f f q  we must unrludc that God will 
have to lntswene wn-ly in the -red world to renew His will (which a the very 
parition that the oscsJinraliru explicitly deny). His ~ c o n d  objsction is tk ths anempr 
to explain the asnom ofcreated beings merely by ref--ng to the will ofGod, h i s h  
enso only m the w and leaves m eff-, is to .b.ndar .ny auempt at an explmtidn. 
To rcron to thlr kind ofan 'explanation' is to absndon phllorophy in favor ofUKology: 
if "is w, far b m  explaining the rnMn1h.t i t  is mha to put aside b e  mI5 ofthe 
phnloropher and m cut the Gordim loot with a sword."" tbr th#rdobjmion 8s that lhe 
rubnancs afthtng. ~tselfeons~ru !n ths farce of acting and being acted upm; hrrs it  
follow that no endm.ng thing can be pmduxd if no fome that long e n d m  be 
lmpre r~d  upon i t  by the divine -:" Without thir f- in created things (which the 
accarionalirs deny), no crutsd rubavxe or tdentissl soul would he p m - m  uul 
"'werythnng would d u e e  to s certain ma-t and flovlng moditicatimr n 
phantasms, ro to s p a L ,  of the ar psrnwcnt divlne rvbrtancs Oad would be the nature 
and substance of all things -a  doetrine of m m  evil repute, whtch s uritcr who was 
subtle d e e d  but irreligious [Spim],  in resen yran impored upon the -14 or at 
1- revn~ed.'~' In addition to thev dificultia, the occasionalih' poritim that created 
beings pus- no power of their awn lies in direcl oppo*tian to aur immediate 
conrcrour~~r of mind as pounring immanent r r i m  As Lsnbnir w k r .  
Ccnainly i f  thir doemne 8s enended YI far ss m deny even the ~YIYIYIYI~I  
acrronr of  suhnaneer I...] it wemr forsim to -n ss no other view can 
be. For who w l l  doubt that the mmd thinks and will$, tha many though& 
and ~olntmonr irr p m d d  ~n wand m u< and !hat thcrc tr romclhnng 
\puntenmus abut u\' lo doubr mlr w u l d  he to h r  human freedom 
and lo thrun the c a w  of ml hack m o  Gad bm alro to comdnu the 
testlmony o f  our ~ n t s d  sxprienn and conwiwnnr, by whlsh we feel 
tha what these opponentr have w n r f d  to God wthom svm the 
ap-nce o f  a -n klongr m ourwlver.'' 
In asmain ma-r, Leibniz'r oriticirmsofocsar~odism continue into the W 
E u a v r o n H u m a n U ~ n g ( I 7 0 4 )  AlthoughtheNewEusvrwrnwitM in 
response lo John Laeke's m v  concanine Human Undmwding many of Leibnlis 
critieirmr o f  Locks in thtr ten are rsmulrably dmt1.r lo his clitisiwns ofowasianalinn 
an his On N a m  luclt" Much like his critiqueofasarionalirm m the lanerpnofthe 
Lexbntr-Amuld -+, Lcibnir'r mittqus o f  h k e  is m ~ e c t e d  with his w 
account of miasln and emphasis en natural paver' In the Nsw LeLeibnlr reads 
strongly against Loeke's aqgesuon that rmtvr mi@ be able to think ifGod were to 
choose to endow m a r  with the power of though. Agsinn this rugss6on. Leibnir 
returns to the pints that he had made against the ocmionaliru, now dtrecDdat Locke. 
He wnter 'Mthin t k  order of m m  (minelsr apan) 11 s not at God's arbntrary 
dnrcretion to attaeh this orthat quality haphazardly to rubstancer. He w l l  never give 
them any which are n a  natural to them, that ir, whish cannot arise from thew nature ar 
explicable mod~ticanom.'~' As SNan B r m  comctly points out. Leibnn "does add 
'm#neler apn'  in parenthesis. Bm ame lhne are no mnraeles wthin the order o f  
nature this parenthervr does not m e  as a qurlitisslion. I t  xsmr Leibniz really did want 
lo deny that i t  8s opn ~ O T  Gad to change the p m p n i ~ ~ o f ~ u b s a m c ' " '  Thus. Lsibnir's 
disagreements with Loeke lie largely 10 his newfound emphasis on natwal p o w m  Smu 
clantieanon of thbcntisiun, and is sonnrmon w l h  Lenbnir's snlique ofocmimtl im. 
can be found in a l a w  pan of the- where Leibnir directly .ddRM Lake?  
ruggmion regarding Ood's ability m rupnsdd thought to m m r  Lsibnir untes: 
To spak o f  sheerly 'giving' or 'granting' powen b to reNm to the bare 
fxul t~e.  o f  the Sshols~ties, and to entertain n pisare of l#nls subsistent 
beings whish can fly ~n and om like pgeom wth  a d o v w  [...I To 
mainfain that Gad aeu in  any other way, and given thine ssstdenD whish 
arc not wa\r ot bclng or mcd8Iiealtnnr mstnp h m  rvbnanccr I s  to ha%c 
rccoune to mlraelcr and to w h ~  thc Lchalarncr uxd to all &cnaal 
mun It -Id snrohc 1 Land o f  ~rrrmlwrl eloaune ot Ihlnsr as on - - " - 
the claim o f  some thmlo@ans lhat kll-f ire bums ypamtd sdulr; which 
leaves opsn the quernon ofwhether 11 w u l d  k the fire whlsh w %Inn 
ratherthan God acting on place of the fire and produe~ng ths m e  effect! 
Loeke'r rusgsrtion thstmanermlght be able to thmk if God were to superadd the 
eapcily o f  thoughtto m n e r  involvs. the same di f ieul t ia  ar Malcbranche's doctine of 
oscari~nalirm.~' In the m e  way Umt Leibnir's disageemms with L a k e  M 
connected m his disagreements with L c  awionnlisu, t h m  is also among eo~eenon 
between Lembniz's d#ragwmsnU with L a k e  and his philowphial d i a p m e n c r  with 
Sir Isaac Newton. b lbn i r  even suggs$led that k k e  wfeprd Newon's univ-1 
gavitatnon as a m- to lend ruppon to hmr claim lhat Gad might be able m rupradd 
thought to In the - k h e t w  "for he W k e ]  p n s  attractton to 
them Fadies], even at great d i m  and without l imimtimm any s p k  o f  activity. 
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to  lugo on) ' ~ o  IN, (sdmmmg anrunon1 n s.11 bc pmvlobk no 8. q b . 8  vhrnone x-dcr 
on? wll k ablcl, ~ u c t u  muno the poxn 41bnlnp. nd m* IL -4's ~m.rul#~ uhxh n a.
ofthr pnnopd f-mom o<ru!urd h l o g )  nr\m u u  IN, U r  l c d c  xw rrr wt am m n n d  
orlhr m ~ l m ~ ~ v v r d c l p n o u n t k v p m m u ~ L t N n l o n ~ l r n ~ u ~ . W c u c d . m d * k c ~ k ~  
rormo1, kll*d u.h r e r a n  lrvl . Dad, -01 mm. .notho ~mdlu.) mw b to*ng .no P".Nnl 
merely roar to uphold a v l n u  whish is equnlly inexplicable, namely lhe porsibiliry of 
mamr fhinking in Ux MDunl murre ofevent%-'' However, Nnvton'r univmal 
gramtation (whieh Leibnnz easmably imrrprrrsd sr an tmunu ofGod's acnon al a 
distance) is also rureptible a fhe p ims  U~at he made .g.inw Ux h s i n u l i i n u l i J t r .  As 
Lsibniz writer- "So we m y  Uke it that m a w  will mt naturally possess the amactive 
power refened to above, ad that at *I1 mt of iaslfmovs in asurvd pus befause 11 IS 
~mposible u,cmcelve hau lhis could happn - that is, I0 explain 11 m55hani1ticaIIy - 
whe- what 15 Nwl rnun be r w h  s r ~ u l d  become d8ninnly eoneei~ble by anyom 
admined into the vsreu of things."" FwUsrmors, jun sr in ths hypothesir of 
occsrnonal caws, accepting Lask'r suggestion w Newton's 'sxpl-tion' ofgraviwion 
would nnvolve an abmdmmcnt oflhe very aIfSmpl fo povide e x p l a ~ t i n .  Leibniz 
maker thvr pint, already familiar u, ur horn his On Nanue las l t  vn the followng O n  
(which also w- a ~ w a l  the connection of leibniz's mew account o f  mimsla u, his 
Thnr dirnnst~on bnween what is namral and sxpltubls and what Is 
m8rasulou~ and ~nexplneable rrm- all the d~f icul t~n To rqrct 11 
twuld k to uphold wmethsng uons than occult qdlttcr and lhcrsby to 
renounce ~ h t l ~ c h  and rcavrn mrtne rsfvec to lmoranee and lmnsr5 . . , - ~  - - 
bv means o f  an ~rrattorul rvrtsm which mninmnr, not onlv that there are 
qvllntia whnch we do not unds-d - of whleh there are only fa, many - 
but funher that them are some vhmsh -Id not be compchended bv the 
b~camt n u l l e ~ ~  m f  God gave -0 p s ~ ~ b l c  opp~nvlnw t e lqual~t~erl 
u h ~ h  are eather mnracvlour or wLour rhrme or mun And n n d d  11 
w u l d  k wfhout rhyme or m n  for God to psrfom m ~ m l e r  ~n the 
- -  - -  
iL h e m r ~ d h i s o p i n a n m ~ b I l b j o n i n m ~ I h e ~ h e ~ m ~ o f h i ~ b m k t t t h ~ n g  
.r if Mr Newon l h o d  IhU mnnt is i d l e  of h i g h  fuulficl fhul om W m r "  
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ordinary am of e m u .  Sa this idle hypnhsrir -Id desmy nm only 
our ph~lasophy which -lu reasom but aim the divine wisdom ahlsh 
p m ~ l & ~  
Lavbnir's snnslrmr o f  Nnrton's philosophy arr fM ln ly  not anfined mthc Nnu 
w. R r  disagreements with NnMon -ivs n very smmivs weamrent in hns 
conerpondena(1715-1716) wth NoMon'r follom, h u e 1  Clarke. As with the 
oecarionalirts and La~ke. Laibniz'r disagrrrmena with Clarke occur vithln the -ten 
of a dmsagrrrmcm over the nanuc o f  mmulsr. Clarke's pon~tion on mtwal power md his 
account of the name ofmirasia lie in abrolute opporition to Leibniz'r maturs psit~on. 
In opporltion to Lelbntz, Clarke holds that the aneept ofanivs power in matter I& to 
atheism. As a follower of Newton. Clarke holds that the natural world is entirely w i v e  
and requires God'r a-t mtervennon. A-ding to Newoh this n a w l  Im of 
force" p i n e  10 the orinsnsc of  m e  m e w 1  'aetlve pnnsiplcr' that provide the 
necessary force to compensate for this tors o f m ~ i o n  in 6 s  natural world" Although 
66 
" , n h i . ~ N I * n o n -  '-M&..mch".,re.pPPbe~,hngn ,d, , . I .~.y~"po"*e 
DIur Far Bcdiauhichu.ri#hrrhrrbroI~III~ hub hubhub hub hub* R RR b e d  ofElmtiW. will not +nd 
Rhrrcc .I 4, e q  to ,*,.ma ,hl, ,f nu) srmpuou. lnnlcnofmoltm RlCh *oc "~h*f,hon r. ,us 
as t n o ~  r n r h  wrnr u- lo #c*ohc h u t  !he Cun url 61 n Y.n n Ihrr ma dl l h r  M s  x d d  by 
~hrsr Tcnaon uld S a f f n m  r n m n u ~ u l e  ,nor rtouon lo o m  mb 8 Il tm .It mcd a m  I h x h a  
vonim.rb~ w.to. - eueddd M*M- MMghgh ghonghghghgh I~~~~~~ M M ~ .  h t  ~nlns b w.nr 
ware void ofdl T o l u m d  nOmion ofPutr and Commurnut~mofMa#oh (hash IS mtto k 
Nemn r e f w d  to provide any a-1 explanation ofthese 'active prineipls', Clarke 
concludes that they onginate in P~I~~DPI mivitypnd therefore sees them as evidence for 
the excrtpnss ofGod Thus (\nth Newon) Clulre clacmr Ulat the nawrl  d d  q u i m  
an enema1 ram of force lo maintain its k i n g  whik (am fmm Newon) be ~oncludsr 
that this efismal smrce lier in Divine aetiviry" C lde ' r  p i t i o n  on tk name of 
mlrasler follows fmm thers sarlurlonr sban the m i t y  for W r  cmsWt 
~ntment#on m the nanunl world. Sinss thsrs a no pow, inherem in tk nahval world, 
all power coming hom a rupmntunl roum, Clarke holds that we should no1 
differentiate between miraculaur md nonmirasulovr sventr on the barir of rams 
~nlrinric difisvlty (as Leibmr suggertr). but on the h ~ r  of thetr unwuslncss '6  
klbnlz'r eriticirmr o f  thts p i t ~ o n  are, oot surprisingly, very similar I0 h81 critic~ms of 
the acasionaliru Innee, fmm Le~bniz'r pnopnive, Clarke's positnon on natural power 
and m~raslsr is very amilar to Ur ocsasionaliltl' pmltion. In fsst, in an early m i o n  of 
*uo%nd lha~, r$ !mng\ hnx ur mu *trrr oeud bl hxr hxr hxrhxr hxrk m u d  wwldl 
5 plvnl~ iax ~rn-uc m Fur ~o no, to s) ~u l .  ayl wltn 13 undv  uuwblr o r o h y l n ~  
m* Llr, tnc "en onplru Llvror W0,lon Ikmxhcr-, m n r c  ," ,uc ~ l r c  r r  b, u-n* 
.vrmor io a,,n-irndly -iw 8" *amam F F F F F  P P P d # " g i o  W C ~ W &  a d  - 
deternunre law [ I And n m d y s .  h r  Th.l mas u n i d  h d p I e o f G R ~ I 1 I 4  4hc Sp6n~ef  
a l m s  dlthgmar.nd~guhr8nnmnnmMa(i~a(iiithc Wdd- [as I b d i n m y f f f  n 
oisrourw~ n n  all rothe s u b o f  sodla. bywhishdow % un one uwnmorhnhbu WYYY 
thelr Solld mntem. -r panbly kLh -It ofmy M m o n o n s d ~  m+an Mnm, hll -of 
nrrarmry be uusd by romcthhg which pnntnUr w s l ~ d  Sub-sc o f d i  B d m .  .nd sontinvllly 
pun fonh in them a F o m a  P ~ w e m i d y  C R m  666 thlt by which Man- nn on W W s h  8% 
by the by. rn endm dermatm1104 m onhiof Lh World's bnnqmde nhiglglIIy by I SUPPP Imelllgmm 
Couu. bur murmnrlhar 8, - M o m  00 sm Sumor &in& for IbPnpnW,w#ofi is 
Fa%"+ Md th.r 8" Ik- Mouonl7" 8,. maurad by Y Y Y  I r n I ~ " a l  PPPP, P P  h h n g o ~ d d l l y  
i m p r e d  a c m n ~ J n ~ r ~ ~ o ~ m ~ ~ v ~  M-. M poptwlly ur( my a 
Mom", in q p m  of th. World" (Cld.. -. pp 20.221 
Leibniz'r third lmer to Clarke, Leibnir drew an explisitcompan'wn benueen Clarke and 
the occas#odiru." T h q  sw-nsr Cluke'r psition an natural power and ths nmrre of 
rnnrasla, Lenbnnr -Is the m e  pointr thst he had previously mads agamn the 
~ , . n a l i ~ t $  and LoEkS. He ,",Its: 
Dl>tmr mll  mt grant Ihc author r paallon a w n s  me \tr that !here or 
nod~ffcmcc mth mpel lo God bcrwcm mlwal md supsrnnlural and 
11 ulll be nail less amroved b mon Dhllaookn There IS a $ut 
differnee b%wen the& two things, but h plainiy a- it has m t  bssn 
duly conr idd.  That rvhleh fi rupsmatvral excseds the powerr of 
creatures I 'hall #re an on- rhtch I hare uRcn made uw abf ~ 4 t h  
g m d  rue- I f  God uodd nuu a bod) to mmc free mn the nhcr round 
a m a  a c m n  fixed seoVr ullhou anv other c r e a m  ncclnc umn 11 I 
ray i t  could mt be done mthout n mimi;, rmce i t  cannot be e;pl;med by 
the name ofbodies For a free body doer nanunlly recede horn a 5-5 ~n 
the fangsnt. And therefore I rnamaln that the anraction of bodles, 
p-ly w, called. is a m~raculous thmng, since i t  cannot be explmnsd by 
the name oftdies." 
As Vailatv notes 'Ths reference to gravitanon being unexplicable [riel by reference to 
the nature of bodies would usm to ruggntthst in kibniz's eyes not only had Clarke 
fallen into Malebranshe's emr  of making n a n d  lam eminsrs to bodies. buf he a h  
had fallen into a variun of Loeke's emnbynllowing nonmechmical, that is, nnunodal 
and unintsll~glbls qualines in bodies.'" Fmm Leibniz'r -rive Newon's uni-1 
gravitstnon ( s  actla at a d i m e )  is an inaancc of u'esinulin-like sawtion. Vsilsli 
even goes so far as to SUWSI thst Leibniz m i a t  haw seen CIsrk6'1 phiI0x)phy as a 
developnent of -s of fhc warsf el-m in Mnlebnnche's philosophy" 
Furthermore, Lnbnir arguer that Clarke's position an God's rsplenirhmmtofthe natural 
world undercuts Ood'r ommi-. Ofwuns Clarke argues thst Le~bniz's philmophy 
eliminates the " w i r y  of miracle and the mtwal wrld'r dependence upon God and 
that hcs philosophy thmfoce wnrtiMesa mpthst evsnrually leads to the mmplets 
elmmmat~on o f  God." 
Thus. by the time of his c o n n ~ c s  wd Clarke. Lstbniz had developed a 
great deal of sontidrnce in hnr new mount ofmlrseles and his criticism of 
oecas#onalnrm. He was able to repst this cnticim un a number ofdifferent cantem, a d  
even able to we, thmugh Clarke's philosophy. whns tkermrr of  the oecasionalats 
could lead; and his emphasis on n s h d  pmm b d  become w, greatthat hm philosophy 
was OPR at least in this polemical mnten, to aeharge of latent naturalism 
I-o $hod d kwye 8. -dm- won lh hwofmhUYm Y. ~ l h  m m  On* 4 t r n ~ Y l ~  
alnn than m acmr-s. m h  -h.mcll hrr U n s d  g.\naaon ubch m Wmmckhculd Luny 
x r r  1 mcr.amyrm\pnabl,q , "Chb.nd \ w o n  rud-. red,,, I" prm In .n. ,h.L *nh 
r n p m  to I". \XL,. d,)u"g. <kmu*n u mu a" pow*, w p m  l o  oclrua 0% q u l 1 ,  ma ,Ilk 
M to h 30°C Ih., I. t h  b l e w  ,rut wmc 4,lndR"rm tu tnr r 0 . w  a1 DvLrr ,ha, CCI. had "d lo 
.*uu thr PlWh 8,)  O f M m ' ~  p r r p u a l k r ,  for OLh monnm., \em,nruul~p.nl.llon ,\u,.,a m 
IML161) 
"' As Vdnli Mntr out C W e  M Ihn mb%z -d Cnd horn h o r n  WIWI muehuehuehuehWn~ God an 
~ ~ ~ r e l l ~ g r g r g r g r g r g r ~ g r ~  and M Y ~ C M Y ~ C M Y ~ C M ~  u u l d  mrindin~  us nu6ng0om lhe 
dmlleni dwcleadm~tothh hndemcdmceofrmm hornGod 1 I le?Nllhou(lhr that Clarke had dod Cnd 
Leibniz'r philosoph~s~l dcvelqmmt as dcunbed here bg.n with h 
dsramemens o f  hbnizand Amauld over the Ihtneenth po(asit8on ~n Lsibnir's 
Dmwourw on MNohvsiu. This m i t i o n  1s imp- since Lcmbniz pnentJ his 
cnesism of Malsb-heas following horn it, for i t  follow fmrn this pmpmntion that 
c k r e  cannot bs a cnauntdivine tntsrventian in the srratsd world Since ocsariorulism 
rcqarer God's conslmt intc~vmtion via mw o f  *!I, Leibnir rwludcs that 
oecarnonalirm 8s an inadequate hypnhir .  In opposition toaeswonalirrn. Lenbnir 
offerr his hypothesis ofths p m b l i r h e d  b o n y  
Althavgh Amauldme to Lsnbnnz'r thinesnth m i l i o n  he did mt also 
accept Leibniz'r critique ofocrrrionalirm. Amuld'r defeme ofwcas~onalirm 
prompted Leibniz to clarify his diKsmce hom ths occasionalias lhmugh s new sssount 
of m~raclcr. In so doing Leibniz discovered his rme diKereme horn the oecnrionnlias. 
In the subrcqmt and final priod of his philosophical developnsrn fmm Ihe 
New Swem to his mmqmn&ncc with Smucl Clde, the inflvenee of Malebranche 
and impact o f  Amauld upa Lsibniz's thought yieldsd some new ugumen~ agaimt 
Locke and the Newoniar, m whom Ls~bnnr ecognized sdslmsnsof the cmastorulirm 
of Malebranche LeibnlZs new snnsnm of cccasionalism. and all h t  follows horn it, 
arc c m . 4  into thew nrtemems of  Ins maom p i t l a .  
Chaptn m. A Clmn Lmkat Leibniz'r Philmophical Devslopnsnt 
A% us have unr, mwhofLeibnir'r philm@icd dsvelapnsnt ean be explained 
by hmr dlffmnee fmm M d c b ~ ~ ~ h c .  This difference occurs overthree stages During 
the earliest Ngc, rhmvn inCh.p(n I, Leibnir nmplisn thM he supporn M . l e M r  
pmjsa m pnnal, but also ambigwusly ruggerrs that Malebraneke hss left this pojm 
incomplete. In the veond stage, m the D i r c o w  on Meuohvriss and the csrty Lecbnir- 
Amauld compndcnss, Letbnizdsarly nnfn his oppattiar to Malebmhc As us 
have seen, Lsibniz'r cnticirm irelther pmrly Nted or mivonseiwd ar this 53s. 
However, by the final stage, from the late tstbniz-ir-Anaudcorrerpondence m the Leibnnr- 
Clake c o m p o m .  Leibnic thmugh Amauld'r pmmpting diwoven hns U w  
difference fmm Malsbronehe thmugh his new aaounr of miracle andemphasis on 
natural pawem Nav that we have some understandingofthis development ws CM begin 
to ask questions about what i t  might msan. Unform~fely, sins. most ofthir 
development =sun wthin the context ofa Uro log id  debnte. such n quntlon is not 
generally r a i d .  In the rNdy ofthe history o f  philmophy 11 oftm wems to be overlooked 
or porably dismnsd as a mere thmloglsal disputethat emml have pnyrhingto offer to 
reriovr philosophy Althaugh i~ ir mr that much ofthis development doer a c w  within 
the conten of a fheolqkal debate, there is. ar ws shall e. much more of fi lmphicsl 
interen h m  Ulan a simple dirpne over W r  dimity and -r 
In this rtudy Uls history of Leibnir'r philorophnsal devel-nt begins with, and 
#r wmmlly defined by, ha disagreements with MalebrrnsheU Acwiour f a m o f  
Malebranche'r philosophy is its comedon with the eighteenlh~enrury philaopher 
David Hums. H m c  8s ofmurre famous for his cririguc afaurmneept o f  caman.  But 
the crit~cirms that Malcbnahe levia mainn !he Scholastic eonsspt ofcnw18on in 
Chapter 1 re1 up UK p i b i l i t y  forthis Hwnevt critiqus. Charles McCnsLm crprruer 
thlr nusly noted influem o f  Malebmshe upon Hums. somsthing that Hume himwlf 
in defending thedoemhe that God is UK only mK saw. Mnlebrsnshs hsd 
fell called upm bah to eve R ~ M I ~  for rejecting ow ord~wy  ruwntnon 
that there is m e  natural nsseuily mmecting cvcm that are alway~ 
sonjolnsd, and m ptovlde u,mc aplnnation o f  how we come u, mngly  
10 belleve that bere I such a nerruary eoxmedion. ~f none eurts. In so 
doin$ Malehche provided both a srinque of natural causality as 
'ncsprwy corn~~lcon' and a psychological mnt of the way 8" which 
the connant emjunnion of evens lea& u s  IO believe 10 such a natural 
nsesrnty 
Malebranshe, in hts rejectton of the possibility thal either bodies w finite mmds could 
move badia. pmvidd Hume wth an argument for dcnylng thst we have any idea of 
O( c a r s  tb, .c-a srm, arofrro.l -he *,,. l o " . d " ~ d , r r n m q  d L & .  
,"A 0,opluu mo1opmon tor  eunplc um1. s t w  Blow -r I *rnl.r.rnavn m L. 1991 mock 
\l%rmurhe s O s u r d y .  .nd Lnbw \ Rrrn~MoM blumm rr pr-nr a n#Rom t y n  
mmpallble# lu- nox f- on kbnr r ~ ~ I O P P P D  DD  uf ~ b -  n ms ,984 boos L s b u  
I' I I ~ r n c  I". Irn" to b. hcm \I,- Rum., l., W-k a,. M , M  m o m  A, Hum *"la 
id r n c m c r  I. RC l tm~k* la  \",,t<,fP"~ \Idebm"'k ,hcR,mpl"nrHu..n Knor*ds10) a 
H n g r  q n m e  a trr  m e  na.phnral A n r l a  a RI e$ Rcl- r r h  n I- Inn Lmo d Spoon 
Dn-Cmn Ualdlo", x a o  d.0 bc "uful b,, do" do do d o f , ~  %dl 6 d  " -,I" Y " D  jC.4 
+ c q a n c m u r  T h e  8m.r xdl makc $0" crnh mrvenrnd Itr mn.on,uul Pans ofmv Rlumnaand 
a . u  tnr m t  tm ha*ew,onr -drnr.rnd~ fo- n r t m u o f ~ ~ ~ o r o p h ~  crvn ) u r  n u - 1 ~ ~ 2  
\mu ., IAROCO ,oJ I ~ p h ~ y t ~ ~ . d . c  ~ r n r n r  ~oc i . 6  %i,l-w ( I I L ~ C  n r d u a r d  ,n n c c ~ t n  p 
254, ~ 1 t C ~ c . m  n  tnat ihcomplac~me# mr~vned b, 1 H PuoLln~n 30 t l v m  h d  R u a  
Wkr.n l o r m r o f . P b o l o ~ h ) ( l a M I  $01 01, pp 711  5 T r ~ ~ r f u l r c l d a o f b o l h  L l reblwkud 
Hlmc tnc ronnalon'nnxee" Irn ,xo prulaopk.3 u e  rim 
power or fore. As Meracken poi* out although Malebnnehe'r argummu rsa on an 
a w l  to the purs intelled while Hwn5'1 restlon M a m  to renre expetienec, Ue 
pant a the same fnbnh philmphen..' &€=ken also ruggntr that Hwne'r 
emphasis on causation PI a wcsmry-tion o w  m w h  ID Malebrmehc' In fan 
Malcbmchs war rueh s gert i n f l m e  upan Hume that MeCracLm wen goes so far PS 
to suggest h t  Hums might have 'hot only k q  k Search in  mimi  ~1 he wcne on 
cauralmly. but rhat he even had it o p n  forson~ulwnon while writing.'+' However. thlr 
b not mean Ihpt all o f  Humeis work wnr dons for him b?. Maleb-he. As 
McCwksn puts it. 
That Hwne was a thinker of greal aiglnality and powr is obvrous. What 
mar be lcrr ob\tous or k prcstv s h n n t n  o f  h8r ongnaltr) Much anf 
the Irrur,sr Is tn f m  bonoued )el. tor all t h a ~  11 rcmalnr a uoA ol 
crcsm,onal mmnnlnw The rearon fur thtr 8s nn hard to ddwvcr Hums 
had gifi for-&&; in  the >&a$ of ohm porsibilitia tha.1 were not 
alwayr op-t to their migmaon. Agun and awn, he look wer #&a$ 
and argumens fiom hnr so- and p.rsed 6om h m  more far-renshnng 
consequences Lhan had Uenr inntid prnpnenls-conqsquenrrr, ~ndeed, 
that the authar o f  thow id- wuld oRcn have deravowed" 
,.... . -&%=, . 
McCracka p 258 McC~ckm *a Uir a r d n  .R.R m p n i n g  a Ran HUH to a 
-gE horn Mdlnnhc  Fora~.I+ MeCnsLcn e s  we-pue m s ' T h c r r u e l o n Z  uho 
m.nlul that Mls oprucbyth5Trubnau.l f- nhm b y l h e + d e m r o r w d F I .  wcnl. * 
thar  m,er md f0"n $3"- * uxir form ud -dm.. 0 t h  * - n- ud hruhiuhi disk4 6060 
all Ihll' (Hum. sqmcd m McCmck~n p 257)10 Mdrbruxhr's "Thncuc plu!aqhem who m w l i n  
#hat -6 - .c~ by ~hru s h m 3  form MW b ~ d a t  or w a a c  c b M~II- 4 
Form. olhnsby Form md A c e k l s  olhcr*II * a n v n & r  m h h i n  dm"" hrm .I1 ,hi' 
(Maldmsh+ rrqvad m MICNLa P 257) 
" McCrackm. p 255 
What MsCnwkcn says here ~scsttmnly rme. Although there slsuly n w  B m n g  
influeme of M a l s b m k  vpon Hwne. Hums, the -SLepticnl Nuumlist", ~crrninly dtd 
draw out conscquemr with whish Malebnnshe. Ue Thrirnan Plmmin", would 
disa.ges?' 
Whsrp does Leibniz 61 inw thir MAebmnshe-Hume corntian? Hmedon nM lint 
Lstbnm ar an inf luem on has work. Still there is a m w  ln A i c h  lo i l l ' s  philmophy 
may k vsn ar being even d o n  w Hume than the p h i l o  As ws 
have - Leibniz's critique ofMslebranehe in theearly p r l  of  his -parden= with 
Amauld is romething of a fslr - for Leibnir Ins m u  thir fa l r  - brings Leibnir 
(qutre unwiningly) remarkably close to a Hvmean pasidan. Thlr critique tnvolver the 
asswt~on that MalebmdWr God is requited cMaWtly m inlervenc, %& nnv anr of 
~ 1 1 .  m the created world In place ofMalebmhe'r -ionatism Lsibnir off- his 
notion ofa p.esmbliskd hsnmny. The pRsstablirhed hammny as it is prsented 
there rlmply d u c n G d r  interntion in the world ( a d  hence all -1 sawlility) lo 
G d r  inlrial erearivs act ARer thir singular inrtsnrr of real causality, the pre- 
ertabl~rhed harmony m r  la lrave ur with d i n g  bulappenlenvrplity and wn- 
caual regulsntier. 
For very gmd -N (nome of which we will addrew rhonly) Leibniz is rarely 
prewnM ar being close to Hums. However, the qusn-Human nMwc ofthe Leihidm 
prc-crtablirhd harmmy. as i t  is presented in lhe early pan of  the Leibniz-Anrsuld 
mrrerpondme. might rerm 1- surprising when \w uop to compsre Leibnh'r ~fique 
of oeearionnlirm at this rugs with Hme'r critique. Nm only doer Leibnlz'r prs- 
etablirhed harmony pos~ess nome Hum- shar, bur kibniz's cntisuwn of 
oecarionalism here is idenneal wilh Hums's. As McCmken poinuout. 
Like Lmbniq he p m e ]  objected that Occarional~m implies that God 
mvrt eonttntl.lly act in the wmld ar if by m n m t  miracle: but surely 'it 
argues more wisdom to m m v e  at fim the fabric of the world wilh rush 
p r fea  fowl& thaQ of iself, and by IS pmpn oprarion, a may d l  
the plrpmsr of povidmse, than if the great Cream were o h l i d  every 
moment to adjurt is parts, and animate by h ~ r  hrsath dl the wheels of that 
rmpndaus machine' 
At thll stage Lsibnu'r criticism ofascasiodirm is eonrinmt with the Hwnm pmrion; 
and his prs-esablirhed hammy canaim nome elemem of Hume's cntique of the 
ordinary concept of auration. Of muru. Letbniz's m m  po~ltion s clearly om 
Humean. However, a Is nm unnl Leibnhdirsovsrs his tw: diffsrence hm the 
oscarionalirtr, through his new w o v n t  of miracles and new emphasis on power m the 
created world, that his pe-enahlirhed hanony 8% clurly pwged ofthir quasi-Humcan 
world view 
Lenbnu'r e m p k a  on p o w  in lhe created meld in the final stage of hzr 
phllosophieal develapnent, clearly placer him farfmm Malebmshs and Hume. How 
are we to charmtenre Lsibnir's mature view? Given his wc ofArintotelian termimlogy 
m the presentation afhir mpturr pit ion,  we might be tmrpled w suggstthat this 
position 8s a simple rmvn w an Arisloteliangm~t of - t ~ m  However, thmyhout 
his entire phnlcso$ical career. wen as eady ar in his mitin1 di-ment with 
Malebranche (recall Ulnt he a p v e d o f  mlcbranche's mtique of lhe Scholartic mrrcpt 
ofcausation), Lsibnnznrpresv~ rams concern sbovt the Aristotelian tradition, 
erpcnally the Schola~tc An-Iian trrdttion. He tr #n rrmh so r s m d  from the 
Scholmc AriSlmeImn realism h t  tf we lake n s l m  Imk at Lsibnir'r mum p a o n ,  
we can detest r m w m m t  w d  the Knnrian account of causation within Leihnir'r 
thought. 
lmmanuel b t  is mid to have 1swIution1rsd philosophy. As the story goes, Kant 
was prompted w his 'C-ican revolution' by the rLsptiul philosophy o f  h v l d  Hume. 
Amording w Kanf H m s  awoke him horn his 'dogmatic slwnber'; although he thought 
that Hvme war on lhe nght wsk in his ancmpl w explain how our knowledge is 
asqutrsd. he also UIovght that Hwne hsd leR this pjm inmmplets. Hums's 
eptstemology var, unable w provide any erplanatlon ofwhat Kml called rynthetis a 
pnon knowledge. Although we make *eJymhnis a pnMi ju4mme. the ans- W the 
questton of how w e m  capable o f  making* judgments ir not @"en in Hume'r 
accounL Kant's solution w the pmblem of wthefic n primijudmentr war to posit a 
new relatiomhip benvspn the mind and iu objects This 8s wht he calls his 'Copmican 
rwalunon'. Slnee rynthstis a pn-Mi jdgmenu -Id not be explained on the puump60n 
that the mind conforms to iu &jecu. Kmt was led w hypfhesire thm objects conform to 
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the mind On thir acmunQ the mind bnngr sormrhing m h objects it experiences 
What the mnnd bnngr m pncs~otion and exprime Kpadivider into 'fonnr of iaui t ia '  
and 'categotier ofhught '  rnpssnvely. Spcs md sme  are fomr of imuition; the mind 
~nevifnbly -im things u being in - and time since 11 imposes thir mucturs on 
rcnx dam Caure-effq on h otkr hand. is one of the c.1egOri6 of though the mind 
insvlrably lm- thls relational arusture on prceptionr m iusstiviIy of making 
judgmenu of expen- 
If w Imk m Leihniz's msturr pantim and inquire abollth mame of causal 
power in the natural world w san ue some elmem of Ihlr Knntian position sppnr in 
Lenbniz'r thought. One mwcr to avrquestion about the narureofawal p o r n  tn the 
natural world is readtly se-nbls. Leabniz'r imismee ar h independence of a h  
monad and hsr tdmtification of pPrcspnan asan en-ion of w h l  tr wmeived by each 
monsd placer causal p o w  within cash monad, since 11 identifies cash monad as the 
s a w  of i u  own perreptual sates. This much dons moves Lobnir beyond Malebrsnck 
and Hume and nearer to Kant snce  it ~nvolver a mmplsts ~namahat ion ofcavution 
within the monad in mush the rune way as causation is imml i l ed  in the rubjesf (hut as 
a -category of thou&') for Kent However, despite Leibniz's im~stence on the 
independence ofeach m W  tkre vem to he rmther conerptafcamation within 
Leibnnz'r thought whncby monads can be unxeivsd ofas being anivear passive with 
raw to one aWhm In the Mgs&bx for example. Leibnnz states r h v  a monad- 
k thought of as uctingomvardly on an& m o d  insofar as this anivc monad sonulnr 
'perfeuion'. or distim prcep6m d c h  explain B prim what IS happsning in the 
pssrive monad9' Iniodly, Ihis apparmt m d  depsndmse o f m d  r-s IO be m 
dnrect oppannm to Leibnir'r primary p h i l ~ i c a l  position ofthe atus ofme monad 
as an nndspndent king. We arc let3 IO w o n k  how thae +ly fundammmlly 
independent beings can porribly be thovght of- M ing  on wc a m h  The qulsk and 
easy answer to Ihir queraon is the am o f f d  by Leibniz: 'But in simple rubmmer 
there is only an ,deal [nppreml influmss of- morrwl tqrm a m ~ n . " ~  Hower.  this 
answer merely rairer UK further question of how fundammally tndspsndent mt l t in can 
have ony kind of relation (ideal or real) la one nnolher. In Ihir way. Lsibnlr'r account of 
apparent sa-lity (i.s., inmmonadlc, as lo intramonadis, astlan) redues to the 
m e  fwdamsntal q d o n  as Ik quanuanonof h s p ~  andtime (which M, for 
Lnbnis relations of p i n o n  and IUSESIS~DD) MY hom Ihse spinrvpl ud h- 
unmended and limdammt.tly mnrpatial, non4emponl monads Donald Ruthelford 
suggests an answer to Ihtr qwnion. Dcrptts thc fact that Lsibniz'r mctaphysin is 
grounded in tkse m o d .  his mstaphyrics, Ihmugh his account of prcepnon as 
expsrsmon (where soul-like moMm memve the universe ofother monads as n world of 
spatiotempa.lly rslatsd bodies), isable to del!vn b analogue ofrpatiotemporPl 
o&ng among monadr,''m Leibnir achieves this .MI- by dnw'ng on coneIat~ons 
among the rpatiotempanl phsnomclu Uut fnm the comnr of lk prceptionr of 
diffsrmt monads, Leibniz's position wemr to be that relation of soexisfence and 
ru-ion among monadscan be defined in a way that is 'Prp.itic on the 
spriarmpwal order ofthe phammnon -id by !hers m&."+' Given the fact 
that monads psrccivs the univsns of other m& as a -Id of spslioampaslly relaled 
bodies, we can %xplait the ~ptiotnnpwnl nda inbemt in  the prceponr of m a d s  to 
define an order ofmndJtenee and succession ~ w g t h m e  moMds thmrclvsr "'* 1" 
rhlr way. monads may be Ulought of in termsofa phenomenal order of ruccesion and 
cocxlrunce. Thlr. of  sows, m a s  that spce and lime are ~ ~ U O M  As Leibniz 
e~plaon~ to Samuel Cluks. 'this [-I can only be sn i&d Uling eonaintng s sslrsln 
order, where the mind coneeiva the applneation of relation '% This pmnnon insofar u 
It places space and time within the monad a forms thmugh whish the universe mwtbe 
perceive4 and insofmar, a is therefwe -1yrnr of the forms carun'nnive of 
persepon and oftheir l im~taoons"~ puts Lcibniz'r m u n t  of space andtime clox to 
Kant'r snssal poation (where space and limsuc ' f m s  of ~ntultion'). 
Of c a m ,  rpace and tlme are mc the only relational entities in Lelbniz's 
ontology. In his notes for n letter to h r  hs. Leihniz provides w \nth a Inn ofthree 
ofthere relariolul entities: " d ~ ~ ~ t i o n ,  wthc order of r-IM thlngr. and position, or 
the order of smdning things, and inferntion, (I mutun1 Mion  form long as we 
conceive the i d 4  mum1 depndmscof m o d  to la%"* As this lmer irnflies. and- 
Ruthaford explis~tly I M 4  Lsibndr .sewn1 of caw1 rshtiars among monads 8s Bfa 
piece"with his assoum of-and ti=. Thir should nabs rwvirng r i m  rpsss, 
tlms, and caurauon belmgto the same class ofmities (t.r, relatiml w ideal entities). 
Follouing this line of rasoning, we infer Lsnbmr'r poantion to be that causal 
nntmnradis rs la t io~  M bedefined in  a way fhat is vrry similar to the sptioDmpm1 
monadic relations Thir ideal intcn*pendmc of mon& 8s to be &fined i n  terms ofthe 
perceptions of- m&: I n  both case% w e v e  m we there ~ n t m n o d c  dnrions 
r u p ~ n ~ n g o n  the tnmmis popntiss of indivldvrl monlds- w h c k  one monad 'ace' 
on another IS determined entirely by mmlndonrmonghr  r n d w  perccptionra 
In fhlr way, space and time, and imermondic causation are relational entitles the 
exnnence ofwhich is 'prariftc' n r  the pnsspnonr expnwd by Ume monads. Thw 
thew relatmnr (rpsee, tirns, and causation) are not real snutnss. Ihy are something mars 
like thecondittons for the podsibclily of eemem they are m t  in the world ~n the 
ordinmy -, bm'hrs mthn'moder of cowking', or what s mind impmsr on the 
world tn apprehending the a-cnt and &on of ringulsr thing.."'m This vim 
purr Le~bn!r'r concept of caurat~on far h m  the oecasxonalin asmunt. rtnse although 
tauratton tr a m m  cafepry. it $fill uin.( in o p ~ t i o n  m ths acsionallns) in the 
created Howwer, i t  also pns Leibnir's cmssptofcavrauon wen clawrto Kmt'r, rmcs 
causation ewnr MI as s popnyofobjecs or ou r repnm~ons .  buf as a mods of 
conceaon in whish these objeels (our rep-tlonr) m W  be re-nted. L this way, 
Lsibnisr concept ofcausation antiei- Wl idsntlliention of causation a$ a. 
'categoly of thought'. Thm at la of Kant's mat  'Copmi- woIutionon was 
contained m the JeMntrrnh eentwy 'dogmatic' philmophy thm k inherired hnn 
Leibnn thmugh Wolff. 
Although much o f  Leibnir'r disptc wiU, Malcbranche mi@ rrsm to bs r smm 
and of merely fhmlogisal Importance. there s a grsat deal of  winiws and evsn 
rsvoluhonary philmphy underlyingthisdeb. Thesmpt  of Leibntr to diffnmtiate 
hnmsslf fmm M a l e b m k ,  pcfigumdand has pmbsbiy s u l l y  influenced, the diration 
o f  the m t  eighteenth s s n ~ d s b s t c  overthe ~Iweofcausstiom The imporenee of 
the Malebmhe-Leibniz dispute 10 the hislory o f  ph11~0phy becomes evidsnt w k n  we 
arrcmpt to charasterire tho diff- MUrOSn MBleb-he and Lsibnir m the topic of 
ca-tron. Examined in this way, ws can ree that much o f t k  movement hom Hume to 
Kant had irs predecessors in the seventeenth ~snrury debte beween Mnldmncbe and 
Ls-bnlz We may d l 1  have some d o v h  h u t  jusf hmv mvsh ofthtr movement hom 
Hume to Knnt has bem anticlplted in the movsmmt hom Malebranshe to Leibniz 
However, at Ihe vely kart, i t  is e l m  t k l  Malebranehe and Leibniz played a cenual mle 
tn creating Ihe ph~lwphical mnlen for the eighvsnth cenhrry &bale owr the MM of 
~aysalion. 
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